Hunting Down the Payday Loan Customer

The Debt Collection Practices of Two Payday Loan Companies

October 2006

MONSIGNOR JOHN EGAN CAMPAIGN FOR PAYDAY LOAN REFORM

For more information, contact:

Public Action Foundation Citizen Action/Illinois

28 E. Jackson, Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60604 312-427-2114 www.citizenaction-il.org Woodstock Institute

407 S. Dearborn, Suite 550 Chicago, IL 60605 312-427-8070 www.woodstockinst.org



Acknowledgments

The Monsignor John Egan Campaign for Payday Loan Reform acknowledges the invaluable research assistance provided by Susan Staskowski during the collection and analysis of the court cases used in this report.

The Monsignor John Egan Campaign for Payday Loan Reform also acknowledges the leading role played by Citizen Action/Illinois and Woodstock Institute in preparing this report.

Finally, this project would not have been possible without the support of the Woods Fund of Chicago.

Executive Summary


The payday loan industry in Illinois has continued to violate short term lending laws and develop new products with slightly modified terms and conditions specifically to avoid the legislation and regulation designed to protect borrowers seeking short term emergency forms of credit. The newest iteration, the high cost installment loan, has virtually replaced the traditional two week or 31-day payday loans in Illinois and is not covered by the strong consumer protections passed by the General Assembly as part of the Payday Loan Reform Act.

To better understand what types of abuses borrowers are facing, the Monsignor John Egan Campaign has examined the court records of borrowers taken to court by two companies now offering these new payday installment loans, Americash and Cottonwood (doing business as The Cash Store) in 2005 and 2006. These loans, which were made before the Payday Loan Reform Act (PLRA), show the types of abuses and aggressive litigation borrowers can expect from these companies currently offering loans designed to circumvent the law.

Key Findings Since 2004

• The Payday Loan Reform Act is working, but lenders are working hard to evade the law, offering payday installment loans that are expensive and dangerous.

The consumer protections provided by the PLRA have helped to reduce to the cost of using payday loans in Illinois by 39 percent, saving borrowers about \$25 per \$300 loan. However, in an effort to evade these protections, lenders have adapted longer term payday installment loans that are not covered by the act (Figure 1).



- One in three borrowers taken to court by The Cash Store had at least one renewal or "roll over." These renewals provide strong evidence that borrowers who take out these types of loans often enter into a cycles of debt and cannot pay off old loans without resorting to new ones. Since the passage of the PLRA, in a phone survey of a dozen Cash Stores across Illinois conducted in the Summer of 2006, the Egan Campaign identified that Cash Stores were now offering a renewal-driven 140-day loan with nine interest-only payments (similar to nine automatic renewals) and an insurmountable balloon payment of the entire principal. Roll over information was not indicated on Americash contracts reviewed.
- Women made up a large portion of payday loan borrowers taken to court. Of the Americash cases reviewed, 72 percent of the defendants were female, with 23 percent male, and 5 percent gender unknown. Of The Cash Store cases, 66 percent are female, 21 percent are male, and 13 percent are unknown.
- Americash and The Cash Store court cases are heavily concentrated in minority communities. This provides further evidence that these communities are more likely to be impacted by high levels of non-productive debt. Nearly 70 percent of Americash borrowers with pending or complete court cases because of default were located in low- or moderate-income, predominately minority ZIP codes, with nearly 90 percent of cases located in predominately minority communities of any income.
- Borrowers often fail to appear in court, resulting in a default judgment in favor of the lender. In the event that a defendant does not appear in court, a default judgment is granted and the lender wins the case by default. Default judgments were granted in 51 percent of Cash Store cases and 22 percent of Americash cases.
- The average court award is almost twice the average loan amount. Court awards greatly exceed the loan principal, even if the borrower has already made interest payments that exceed the amount they originally borrowed. Americash was awarded \$1,894 for the average loan of \$930, almost twice the amount of the loan. The Cash Store was awarded \$1,287 for the average loan of \$824.
- The length of time between the loan date and the complaint date drastically increases the cost to borrowers in default. The average time between loan origination and the complaint date was 1.81 years for The Cash Store and 1.36 years for Americash.
- The average attorney's fee for Americash cases was \$343 and the average Cash Store case was \$173. Almost all Americash cases had an attorney's fee of \$350, regardless of the amount of the loan or the work that the attorney actually accomplished. The Cash Store fees ranged from \$100 to \$325.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The Payday Loan Industry Since the Passage of the PLRA	1
Payday Lenders are Violating the PLRA and Other Laws	3
Some Lenders Evading the Law with "Look Alike" Loans	4
Debt Collection Practices of Two Payday Installment Lenders	5
Findings from the Debt Collection Cases	9
Recommended Protections for Payday Installment Loans	11
Appendix: Litigation Data	12

Introduction

This report conducts a comprehensive analysis of the high cost installment loan products offered out by Americash and The Cash Store before the adoption of the Payday Loan Reform Act (PLRA) to better understand the default conditions borrowers are now facing as this type of product becomes the predominant loan product in the industry. Americash and The Cash store were selected because they are the two lenders most actively pursuing customers in default through the court system in Cook County, Illinois. This report examines 2004 and 2005 debt collection cases filed by Americash and the Cash Store for loans originated between March 2001 and February 2006. It demonstrates the predatory nature of payday lending—documenting the big game hunt mentality of lenders who stalk payday loan customers for excessive finance charges in an environment with few consumer protections, aggressive debt collection practices and high collection judgments. Further, payday lenders are effectively dragging out the chase of borrowers with the intention of prolonging their indebtedness.

This report begins with a description of changes in the Illinois payday loan industry before and after the approval of the Payday Loan Reform Act (PLRA) demonstrating the ability of the PLRA to reduce the cost of borrowing and provide consumer protections that keep borrowers entering into a short term loan agreement from acquiring long-term non-productive debt. The second section describes the terms and conditions, as well as the default provisions and court outcomes, of installment loans offered by Americash and The Cash Store before the PLRA went into effect. The outcomes make it clear that the companies offering unregulated payday installment loans are offering an expensive and dangerous product and that these new loans should be subject to the same strong consumer protections passed by the General Assembly for traditional short-term payday loans.

The Payday Loan Industry Since the Passage of the PLRA

The payday loan industry in Illinois also has a long history of adapting its short term loan products to ensure that they are not subject to the short term loan restrictions adopted by the General Assembly and state regulators. By offering an unregulated product, the industry is able to continue charging exorbitant interest rates, offer endless cycles of expensive "roll overs" and aggressively pursue borrowers in the court system.

In March of 2004, the Egan Campaign published Greed: An In-depth Study of the Debt Collection Practices, Interest Rates, and Customer Base of a Major Illinois Payday Lender, which provided concrete evidence of the aggressive and often litigious payday loan debt collection practices in Chicago. That report was a study of 444 debt collection cases filed against payday loan customers by Americash Loans, LLC between 2002 and 2003.

Since the Monsignor John Egan Campaign last examined the loans offered by Americash in 2004, there have been significant changes in the regulation of payday loans in Illinois. Based on the recommendations in the 2004 report, the Egan Campaign developed the protections included in the Illinois Payday Loan Reform Act that went into effect in December 2005. The PLRA requires that all short-term lenders in Illinois offering loans with annual percentage rates (APRs) exceeding 36 percent and terms less than 120 days provide additional consumer protections to help keep borrowers out of long-term, unproductive debt. The protections include:

- 1. A fee cap of \$15.50 per \$100 to reduce the cost of using payday loans for every borrower
- 2. An industry wide loan cap limiting payday loan principals to 25 percent of a borrower's income or \$1,000, which ever is less
- 3. Limits borrowers to 45 days of continuous indebtedness before a mandatory debt-free recovery period or repayment plan
- 4. A 7-day recovery period to break the cycle of debt created by back-to-back loans
- 5. A repayment plan that gives any borrower who takes out a payday loan the opportunity to enter into a fee-free repayment plan
- 6. Special protections for military personnel, including a limit on wage garnishments
- 7. A statewide consumer reporting service to aid enforcement of the new protections

Table 1 shows the effect of the PLRA on the cost of borrowing a short-term payday loan in Illinois. Before the PLRA went into effect, lenders charged borrowers an average APR in excess of 573 percent. Since the passage of the Act, the fee cap and other consumer protections have reduced the cost of borrowing the average payday loan to about 351 percent—a 39 percent decrease that saves borrowers about \$25 on the average loan.

Table 1. Traditional Payday Loans Before and After the Payday Loan Reform Act1

	F	rincipal	Fee	Term(3)	APR		of a \$300 for 14 days	Percent Change
Pre-PLRA	\$	331.14	\$ 144.35	14-31 days	573.18%	\$	65.95	
Post-PLRA	\$	309.10	\$ 46.69	15.7	351.17%	\$	40,41	
Additional		A 1.	Administration					
Savings						- \$	25.55	39%

¹ See Monsignor John Egan Campaign for Payday Loan Reform (2004). Greed: An In-depth Study of the Debt Collection Practices, Interest Rates, and Customer Base of a Major Illinois Payday Lender. Public Action Foundation: Chicago. p. 3 and Veritec Solutions (2006). Illinois Trends in Payday Lending – Initial Report. Veritec Solutions: Jacksonville. p. 4. Pre-PLRA figures include loans with terms varying from 14-31 days, the corresponding APR is the average for all loans.

Payday Lenders are Violating the PLRA and Other Laws

Since the PLRA went into effect in December 6, 2005, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulations (DFPR), which regulates payday and payday installment lenders, has issued dozens of enforcement actions and levied hundreds of thousand of dollars of fines against payday lenders. Americash and the Cash Store, two companies whose lending practices are highlighted in this report, have received some of the highest fines for violating the PLRA.

Americash Loans and another large lender, Advance America, have committed several violations of the PLRA and been fined hundreds of thousands of dollars. In July 2006, Americash was fined \$190,000 by DFPR for failing to comply with the PLRA, ignoring consumer protections, and charging finance charges higher than those allowed by law.² Advance America was fined over \$75,000 by DFPR for multiple violations in May 2006.³ Advance America made loans in excess of the maximum term of indebtedness stipulated by the PLRA and over the maximum loan amount. In addition, Advance America violated the PLRA by making more than two payday loans to one borrower.

In April 2006, DFPR shut down four payday installment loan stores operated by the Payday Loan Store of Illinois.⁴ The charges against the stores included knowingly making a loan to consumer with a Social Security number belonging to a dead person, forging documents, and falsifying signatures. In addition, the company discarded the consumer disclosure statements they were required by PLRA to give payday loan borrowers.

Payday lenders have repeatedly engaged in deceptive and misleading advertising to discourage borrowers from taking out loans with consumer protections afforded by PLRA. The Cash Store was fined \$10,000 for displaying advertising that inflated the finance charges of PLRA loans, falsely stating that they are a more expensive option than installment loans. Other payday lenders, including Illinois Lending Corporation and Advance America, have been fined for similar violations.

² Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. Official Press Release (July 9, 2006) Blagojevich Administration and Attorney General Madigan File Simultaneous Enforcement Actions against Payday Lender. Retrieved September 26, 2006 from http://www.idfpr.com/newsrls

³ ibid. Order No. 06CC127 in the Matter of Advance America (May 4, 2006). Order of Fine.

⁴ ibid. Official Press Release (April 2, 2006) Blagojevich Administration Moves to Shut Down Unscrupulous Short-term Lenders. Retrieved September 26, 2006 from http://www.idfpr.com/newsrls

⁵ ibid. Order No. 05CC140 in the Matter of Cottonwood Financial (December 19, 2005) Order Assessing Fine and Suspension of Licenses.

⁶ See Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. Order Assessing Fine in the Matter of Illinois Lending Corporation (December 20, 2005) and Order Assessing Fine in the Matter of Advance America (December 21, 2005).

Some Lenders Evading the Law with "Look Alike" Loans

In addition to flagrant violations of the Act, many Illinois lenders have begun offering "look alike" loans which evade most of the mandated consumer protections. Since the PLRA regulates loans of 120 days or less, the Illinois payday loan industry increasingly marketed and offered their customers payday installment loans with terms of 121 days or more. These new "look alike" loans, called payday installment loans, have many of the same features as installment loans offered before the act, but with a significantly higher price tag. Payday installment lenders have also developed increasingly sophisticated methods of securing their loans, such as directly debiting payments from a borrower's checking account, or requiring wage assignments through the borrower's employer.

Table 2 shows the cost of the typical payday installment loans made after the passage of the PLRA compared to the typical installment loan offered as a low cost alternative to 14- or 31-day payday days before the passage of the PLRA. These same loans now have APRs of almost 400 percent, over five times the cost of installment loans before PLRA.

Payday installment lenders now offer two distinct, but equally dangerous, products designed to evade the PLRA. Some products, like the payday installment loans offered by Americash require the borrower to pay off the loan in equal installments, much like a mortgage or car payment. Unlike these types of loans, however, Americash payday installment loans carry interest rates of nearly 300 percent. Many of these new payday installment loans are little more than traditional short-term payday loans with several "built in" roll-overs. The Cash Store in particular offers this type of product—a 140 day "look alike" loan requiring nine biweekly interest payments, with a final balloon payment of the entire principal amount. For the borrower, this "look alike" loan is essentially a 14-day payday loan with 10 built in rollovers. Like 14-day payday loans, the final balloon payment is extremely difficult to pay in full, necessitating the additional refinancing and cyclical debt common with the 14-day payday loan product. This spiral of prolonged payday loan debt is precisely what the General Assembly attempted to correct with the PLRA by limiting indebtedness of no more than 45 days.

Table 2.	Installment Loa	ns Before and Afte	er the Payday	Loan Reform Act	7
----------	-----------------	--------------------	---------------	-----------------	---

Type of installment Loan		Principal		Fee	Term	APR	t of a \$300 for 140 days	Percent Change
Post-PLRA	\$	354.55	\$	531.37	141.2	387.42%	\$ 445.79	<u> </u>
Pre-PLRA	\$	690.00	\$	374.00	266	74.38%	\$ 85.58	
increase in Average Insta	Hme	ent Loan C	ost	l			\$ 360.21	421%


⁷ See Williams, Marva and Tom Feltner (2004). Reinvestment Alert 25: New Terms for Payday Loans - High Cost Lenders Change Loan Terms to Evade Illinois Consumer Protections. Woodstock Institute: Chicago. p. 4 and Veritec Solutions (2006). Illinois Trends in Payday Lending: Initial Report. p. 4

Debt Collection Practices of Two Payday Installment Lenders

The PLRA was designed to ensure that borrowers in default would not be liable for legal fees or additional interest, and would be able to use a fee-free repayment plan to help break the cycle of debt. In order to understand the risk to borrowers of unregulated payday installment loans, which are made without any of these protections, this report examined the court cases of 194 borrowers who had defaulted on pre-PRLA installment loans offered by Americash and filed in 2005 and 2006. In addition, short-term payday loans offered by The Cash Store, which previously only offered payday loans but has completely switched to the payday installment model since the passage of the PLRA were also analyzed.

All post-PLRA installment loans were designed to evade the consumer protections provided in the act. As a result, there is very little information on the terms and conditions of these loans since none of these loans have been entered into the statewide consumer reporting database. However, by examining the loans made by these two companies, and the court records of the loans in default, this report attempts to illustrate the hazards borrowers face when taking out a longer-term loan without the consumer protections offered by the PLRA.

Chart 2 shows that the frequency of debt collection court cases filed in Cook County, Illinois by Americash and the Cash Store from 1999 to July 2006. All of these cases are for loans originated before PLRA went into effect.




⁸ These court cases were collected and analyzed by the Monsignor John Egan Campaign for Payday Loan Reform and are on file at the offices of the Public Action Foundation, 28 E. Jackson, Suite #605, Chicago, Illinois 60604.

⁹ Cases filed between 1999 and 2005 were collected from a search of the database of the Cook County Clerk of Courts available at http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org [viewed on June 2006].

The court cases filed by Americash and The Cash Store are heavily concentrated in minority ZIP codes, providing further evidence that these communities are more likely to be impacted by high levels of non-productive debt. Nearly 70 percent of Americash borrowers with pending or completed court cases because of default were located in low- or moderate-income, predominately minority ZIP codes, with nearly 90 percent of cases located in predominately minority communities of any income.

Figure 3 shows a summary of the distribution of payday and payday installment loan court cases filed by Americash and The Cash Store across the Chicago region, as mapped in Figure 4.¹⁰



Minority is determined using the percentage of population that is not "Non-Hispanic White." Hispanics are considered minority but can be of any race. Minority is than 50 percent minority, White is less than 50 percent minority. LMI indicates low- or moderate-income based on 80 percent or less of the 2000 U.S. Census Median Family Income (MFI) of \$61,182 for the Chicago PMSA. MUI indicates middle- and upper-income or greater than 80 percent of the MFI.

Figure 4. Distribution of Payday and Payday Installment Loan Court Case




Table 3 contains the court case summary statistics including the average principal, information on refinancing, the use of wage assignments, average amount awarded by the court, attorney's fees, occurrence of default judgments, cases filed against woman, and the geographic distribution of borrowers by community income and minority composition.


Table 3. Summary of Court Cases

Lender Characteristic	Ar	nericash 2004	A	mericash 2006	The	Cash Store 2006
Average Loan Principal Amount	\$	784	\$	930	\$	824
Number of Rollovers		No data		No data		35.19
Percent of Contracts with Wage Assignments		98%		100%		no data
Average Court Award to Lenders	\$	955	\$	1,894.00	\$	1,287.00
Ratio of Award to Loan Amount		2.8 to 1		2 to 1		1.5 to 1
Attorneys Fees	\$	303	\$	343	\$	173
Percent of Default Judgments Granted		N.A.		41%		61%
Percent of Cases Filed Against Women		63.0%		72.3%		65.7%
Percent of Borrowers Residing in Lower-income Communities		67.4%		69.9%		40.5%
Percent of Borrowers Residing in Predominantly Minority Communities		76.5%		90.4%		63.0%

Findings from the Debt Collection Cases

A discussion of the findings is provided below:

- 1. The principals for payday installment loans are larger. The average Americash installment loan increased from \$784 in the 2004 *Greed* report to \$930, an increase of about 20 percent. The average payday loan from The Cash Store is \$824.
- 2. Multiple rollovers are common.



Borrowers using payday and payday installment loans have reported to the members of Egan Campaign describing the endless cycle of debt created by "rolling over" a short term loan. For the first time, the Egan Campaign has evidence that this cycle of debt is pervasive and harmful to a borrower's financial health.

Based on refinancing information collected from 44 Cash Store cases in default, one out of every three cases had at least one "roll over (Figure 5)."

- 3. Wage assignments put payday lenders first in line for borrowers' income. By taking an interest in a borrower's wages, the debt incurred by payday loans is placed in a position ahead of other secured debt, such as home and auto payments. All of the Americash contracts include a standard provision securing the loan with the borrower's wage assignment. The Cash Store contracts did not include this provision and secured their loans with a post-dated check. Few customers realize that these wage assignments are revocable at will; customers simply have to contact their payroll department. When borrowers pay payday lenders first, they are more likely to default on their home mortgage or car loan.
- 4. Wage deductions. Borrowers in default are also likely to have the payments for their payday loan garnished. Both companies are often granted wage garnishments in court judgments—taking income directly from the borrower's employer. Where the outcome of the cases is known, wage deductions were granted in 20 percent of Americash cases and 32 percent of Cash Store cases.
- 5. The average court award is almost twice the average loan amount. Loan judgments on the average Americash loan of \$911 were \$1,765, almost twice the amount of the loan. Loan judgments on the average The Cash Store loan of \$826 were \$1,290.

- 6. The average attorney's fees for The Cash Store cases were \$174, and for Americash cases were \$343. The PLRA forbids lenders from charging attorney's fees. Before the act, both lenders charged borrowers in default attorney's fees as part of the judgment against them, dramatically increasing the borrower's total debt as a percent of the principal. Without the protections afforded by the PLRA, borrowers in default will continue to be charged attorney's fees.
- 7. Judgment-related costs increase the total debt burden for payday loan borrowers. Judgment expenses increase the cost of paying off a payday loan dramatically and often include loan principal, accrued interest, attorney fees, court costs, and damages.
- 8. Mandatory arbitration Most payday loan contracts require borrowers to agree to mandatory arbitration, which is a final and binding dispute resolution process that does not provide many protections for borrowers. Arbitration clauses do not allow trial by jury and may involve prohibitive expenses for the borrower. Further, most arbitral procedures are not public and there is often no provision for an individual to be represented by counsel giving the lender a significant legal advantage.
- 9. Filing delays increase costs for Cash Store customers in default. Although The Cash Store loans reviewed had terms of 30 days, the complaints were filed, on average, 1.36 years after the loan was made. The Americash cases reviewed had an average delay 1.8 years. This delay substantially increases the post-default cost of the loan in cases where interest continues to accrue on the outstanding principal.
- 10. Borrowers often fail to appear in court, resulting in a judgment in favor of the lender. In the event that a defendant does not appear in court, an default judgment is granted and the lender wins the case by default. Default judgments were granted in 61 percent of Cash Store cases and 41 percent of Americash cases.
- 11. Women made up a large portion of borrowers in court because of payday loans. Of the Americash cases reviewed, 72 pecent of the defendants were female, with 23 percent male and 5 percent gender unknown. Of The Cash Store cases, 66 percent are female, 21 percent are male and 13 percent are unknown.
- 12. Americash and The Cash Store court cases are heavily concentrated in minority ZIP codes, providing further evidence that these communities are more likely to be impacted by high levels of non-productive debt. Nearly 70 percent of Americash borrowers with pending or complete court cases because of default were located in low- or moderate-income, predominately minority ZIP codes, with nearly 90 percent of cases located in predominately minority communities of any income.

Recommended Consumer Protections for Payday Installment Loans

Based on characteristics of high cost installment loans that have been settled in the court system described in this report, the Monsignor John Egan Campaign for Payday Loan Reform recommends the following principals to protect borrowers. Like the PLRA, these principals are based on nationally recognized standards for safe borrowing and accommodate the unique terms and conditions of Illinois high cost installment loan. Taken together, they will help protect the interest of consumers and military personnel, limit over borrowing, prevent the cycle of debt caused by multiple rollovers and refinancing, and make high cost installment loans more affordable.

- 1. Loan limit: the amount of the loan should be indexed to the borrower's income.
- 2. Multiple loans: there should be limits on the number of payday and payday installment loans.
- 3. Fee Cap: total fees, including interest, fees, and other costs should be limited.
- 4. Loan Payments: installment loans should be fully amortizing loans with regular and equal term payments. Balloon payments are prohibited.
- 5. Consumer Reporting Service: All loans must be entered into the consumer reporting service, authorized under the Payday Loan Reform Act, to verify and ensure compliance with these consumer protections.
- 6. Military Protections: provisions should be made to protect the interests of military personnel.
- 7. No post default interest: No interest may be permitted to accrue after default.
- 8. No attorney's fees: Legal fees upon default should be barred.
- 9. Mandatory arbitration: No mandatory arbitration clauses that are oppressive, unfair, unconscionable, or substantially in derogation of the rights of consumers

Appendix: Litigation Data

This appendix is the printed version of the litigation database. It includes data for all 194 Americash and Cash Store cases analyzed by the Monsignor John Egan Campaign for Payday Loan Reform.

Variable Description

Co: The company filing the case. "TCS" indicates The Cash Store and "AC indicates Americash.

ZIP: The customers residence ZIP code from the loan contract

The lawsuit's official number as assigned by the Circuit Court of Cook County Case:

Ln Date: The date on which the loan was originated

Sec: The security provided for the loan "WA" indicates wage assignment, "PDC" indicates post-dated check.

Principal: The loan principal dispersed to the borrower

The fee charged for the loan Fee:

Term: The term of the loan

APR: The effective APR charged on the loan based on the principal, term and fee paid by the borrower.

The number of renewals or "roll overs." "No data" indicates that this information was not recorded on Rnwl: the loan contract provided in the court case.

Complete: The date on which the complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County.

The total damages sought by Americash or The Cash Store. Dmgs:

The portion of the damages sought by Americash or The Cash Store to cover the company's attorney's Fees:

The outcome of the case. "B" stands for bankruptcy, "D" for dismissed, "DBA" for dismissed by agreement, "DFLP" for dismissed by agreement, "DV" dismissed voluntarily, "DJ" for default judgment, OC:

"IP" for installment plan, "J" for judgment, "JP" for judgment for plantiff, "U" for unknown and "W" for

wage deduction.

Ded: Indicates a wage deduction.

Due: Total amount sought by lender, including damages and legal fees.

The income of the borrower's home address ZIP code. "LMI" stands for a low- and moderate-income Inc: ZIP code with an income below 80 percent of the Average Family Income for the Chicago region. MUI stands for middle- and upper-income or more than 80 percent of the Average Family Income for the

Chicago region.

The percentage of minority residents in the borrower's home address ZIP code. Minority is determined Min: using the percentage of population that is not "Non-Hispanic White." Hispanics are considered minority

but can be of any race. "1" is greater than 50 percent minority, "2" is less than 50 percent minority.

Appendix: Litigation Data

	į,	(A		er.	_		S. 00		C						 -			.,													
***	yes	<u>£</u>	5	yes	2	2	ģ				ě	٤	5	sex	Š.	2 2 2		ş	že	yes	že.	yes	8	8	8	2 ,	\$8X	2	yes	yes	yes
heome	3	3	5	3	3	DW	B		3	100	₹	Ξ	3	3	3			M	3	3	E	2	H.	3	3	₹;	3	5	₹	Z	3
Disease	none	\$ 1,941.95	none	unknown	\$ 912.60	\$ 1,269.94	Makana	1 . R58.88		400	\$ 1,327.43	none	\$ 677.14	unknown	unknown	\$ 1,086 B3 \$ 1,181 50 \$ 1,000 52	\$ 1,071.45	\$ 1,544.31	\$ 1,825.21	\$ 2,674.81	\$ 1,152.00	\$ 995.56	unknown	- mouter	¥1.881.4	\$ 2,373,83	euou	\$ 1,002.63	none	unknown	\$ 1,273.95
P Ded	92	yes	5	2	5		9				8	2	2	2	٤			٤	yes	٤	yes	yes	9	8	100	2	٤	2	٤	٤	٤
8	œ	3	۵	>	8	3	5	8	3	Ē	3	۵	8	¬	>	ааа	S C	3	3	3	Š	ш	=	7	3	3	모면	<u>a</u>	۵	-	3
8	350	253	18	350	119	166	9	112	88	L.V	173	216	\$	350	350	2 3 8 2 3 8	\$22 MAS	30.	238	350	380	8	8	3	8	0	2	173	45	350	350
, if	•	-	47								*	45	*	**	**	273		~	•	**	**	**	4	7	۰	•	~	**	*	*	~
Dings	\$ 1,188	\$ 1,689	\$ 1,226	\$ 1,243	\$ 794	3.7.8	\$ 1.074	7.7.7.2	8 4.415	200	\$ 1,154	\$ 1,443	\$ 577	\$ 702	\$ 969		0.11.16	5 1,343	1,587	\$ 2,591	\$ 802	998	8	3		2,004	830	1,154	698	1,062	1,274
8	900	8	Š	ğ	2/1/05	8	8	8	8	8	g	92	9	8	8	888	8 8	8	8	8	8	8	8	13	Я	ΥΩ	ıΩ	8	20	<u>ي</u>	S
Complete	3/30/2006	3/11/05	7729/05	6/2/2006	24	3/11/05	3,3,0,0,0,0	311105	4/1905	30.00	3/25/05	3/25/05	2/2/05	6/2/2006	6/2/2006	1, 1,325.05 1, 1,3711.05 3711.05	3505	3/11/05	3/31/05	incomplete	9/13/2005	3/15/05		A ILLAND	32505	¥41206	3/31/05	1/20/05	3/15/05	3/30/2006	incomplete
Rmm	no data	ю 	•	no data	N	2	a de de	9	4		٥	0		no data	no data	9 5 .7	7 1	3	0	no data	no data	0	nodate		9	o.	-	. 0	0	no data	no data
APR	71.5%	538.8%	538.8%	71.6%	538.8%	538.8%	11.0%	8	6	1	538.8%	538.8%	538.8%	8.4%	85.1%	538.8% 538.8% 538.8%	538.8% 538.8%	538.8%	538.7%	85.1%	573.6%	538.8%	*	4	ă	4	8,	.8%	.8%	*	
Ž.								SO 638.6%	30 6S8 B9	00.639.83	S		20			223	2 4		538		573		85.1%	513.01	538.8%	X982	538.8%	538.8%	538.8%	85.1%	575.9%
TO THE	398	8	8	266	8	8	88				æ	98	8	58	266	8 8 8 ****	8	30	8	266	42	8	98	3	3		8	8	ଞ	58 8	42
	521	518	376	522	24	330	22	8	285	266	88	443	177	428	620	8 5 5	260	412	487	428	386	266	428	45	3	3	255	35	354	620	199
2	-	•		~	~		Ž					~	•	•	*	7.2.8		~	•	•	•	•	۰	7.	C.	1	1 ~	**	•	*	S
Rithelps	1,000	1,170	\$ 850	1,000	\$ 550	\$ 785	\$ 2.100	1911	07.6	Section and	\$ 800	1,000	\$ 400	\$ 6,990	1,000	900	5 pr (1,489) 5 pr (1,489)	\$ 931	\$ 1,100	069 \$	\$ 800	\$	9	218	8 - 1 200	000	\$ 575	800	800	1,000	300
£	¥	8	2	Α×	2	8	ş	8	8	3 (s	ည္က	ည္က	ည္က	×	Š.	888	88	႘	ည္ထ	₹	— §	8	S	\$	8	8	20	8	ည္ထ	≤	₹
			_				• J.	CA C	4	· 224			_	_				8		_		<u>. </u>		O. C.				Q.		5	5
Land Parts	3721/01	3/11/02	4/3/02	7/26/02	7/29/02	- PM302	STANTAGE STANTAGE	1290	12MB/02	COLUCIA)	12/24/02	1/3/03	1/18/03	1/24/03	2/1/03	A STORY	201403 ¥ PDC	3/28/03	5/8/03	6/9/03	6/13/03	6/23/03	- 60528 ···	Strong.	£7/1803	1,7/1803 FP	7722/03	7/25/03	7/25/03	7/28/03	7/28/03
	06-m1-125315	05-m1-114489	05-m1-151852	06-m1-143472	05-m1-106297	05-m1-114402	.06-m1-125318	188	06-m1-125395	li osi	05-m1-119187	05-m1-119186	05-m1-106612	\$73	3497	DG-mil-119185 DG-mil-114480 DG-mil-114480	05-m1-118100 (05-m1-118186)	1487	703	501	472	296	08-m1+143495 ₄	9	38	2	ğ	912	595	316	382
4		11	1-15	1-14	5	Ī	2	I	7	3	1-1	=	1-10	1-14	1-14	5 5 5	Ŧ	7	-12	-100	-16	74 S	7	7	F	ম	Ş	-102	-115	125	55
	툿	ξ	Ĕ		₹.	5	\$	Ę	Į	Ą.	Ę	E	Ę	06-m1-143473	06-m1-143497	Demi-11918 Demi-11918 Demi-11948	Semilarians Semilarians	05-m1-114487	05-mt-120703	06-m1-100501	05-m1-167472	05-m1-115596	Ē.		812611-1m-90	OS-m15/23783	05-m1-120704	05-m1-102912	05-m1-115595	06-m1-125316	06-m1-125382
	_	_	_	J	ٔ ب			f 2" D5-m(+11449)		Some or Princi	0	0	0	0	•	9 9 9	9.5	õ	ő	ŏ	ð	ඊ :	đ	đ	4	4	පි	ଞ	8	8	8
	* -	E	E		60						-	÷		E	+	* F.3		*	=	-	<u>-</u>	•	5	*	F	5 ()	-	ε	-	-	ا
Courte Assure Case of	60628	60622	60517	60636	60018	80103	AC - 8064	TCS 80104	TCS ' 80819	TCS 80529	60104	60645	60302	60653	60616	TCS 60074 TCS 60018 TCS 80160	TCS BOIDA	60651	60155	60649	60615	8 2	AC: 60628	8	TCS POG49	168 80830 16 88840	60160	60453	60155	90939	80505
3	Ą	TCS	3	Ą	က ်	S 31	á	3	3	ğ	S	ZCS	TCS	Ą	Q.	ខ្ទុខ	8 8	TCS				ည	ğ	9	3	<u>g</u> s	7 <u>2</u>	25			Ş
78		•	······		·-		-	.	1000	.58			_	-	-	月(時) 標	## F	1-	<u></u>	•	-	` سَوْ			₩.		[=	ĭ	ĭ	•	۹

Appendix: Litigation Data

										···								· /																
	X8.	yes	88	Xes.	2	8				į	0	Xex.	yes	٤	- X85	yes		L.	ļ		sax	2	8	yes	2	0		1	Ļ	yes	<u>\$</u>	5	Ş.	Xes.
	Ξ	Ē	3	Z	3	Ĭ	NI I			E	ALI IA	3	3	Ē	3	3	THE PERSON			E	5	3	3	X	3 2		3	Ī		Ē	₹	Š	3	Ē
4.0	798.00	829.64	1,074.23	unknown	\$ 1,493.35	1 E2284	OU USG H			ecou	الإسرائلوس	995.56	1,410.39	none	none	669.03	A 100 E	orbert.			\$ 820.16	\$ 2,164.29	unknown	749.29	\$ 1,120.01	Manager	5 1,120.0B	040808	14.5	\$ 1,246.83	\$ 1,285.94	unknown	560.00	1,374.04
) a	, yes	8	2	2	2				9	8	31-2	Q.	yes	2	2	2			2 1		2	2	٤	yes	2	ė.	Ž		l	8	2	5	sex sex	2
نان	Ş	3	<u>-</u>	ב	<u>o-</u>	9	T. BA			DBA	i	3	2	OFLP	OBA	2					3	3	>	3	3	7	a a	9		3	<u>a</u>	∍	WD	۵
P. S. S.	250	108	118	350	195	238	9			Ž	1.7	130	184	222	350	119		13	3	S	107	325	350	₽.	46	S	9	3	8	222	8	216	250	185
	*	**	•	**	**	4				Ā		5	•	4	43	S	38	• •	•		*	**	**	•	•	4	•	7	4	~	S	*	•	"
Dine;	\$ 548	\$ 721	\$ 788	\$ 797	\$ 1,299	£ 4.585				319 F.S	S. 11.5	998	\$ 1,226	\$ 629	548	794	Section 1	088			\$ 713	\$ 2,164	\$ 714	\$ 649	\$ 974	\$ 2.184	Y.0.	B 1160	3	\$ 1,479	\$ 1,118	\$ 1,443	\$ 310	\$ 1,235
Courtete.	9/13/2005	3/31/05	272/05	9/13/2005	8/24/05	8/1405	Emilians		×7/12/005	Shoompad	STORES	1/20/05	4/27/05	6/17/05	5/31/2005	8/17/05		90021858	671/2005	SUPPORTE	5/5/05	2805	1/19/2006	3/31/05	4/27/05	82005	90508	90028118	90007	5/23/05	8/17/05	8/4/05	5/31/2005	3/25/05
Rmt	no data	0	М	no data	0	-			1 2	M deta		٥	0	6	no data	0					-	ო	no data	0	0	0	- D		0	0	0	0	no data	·
em ARR	2 573.6%	538.8%	538.8%	2 573.6%	538.8%	O 538.8%				286 85,114	. F. 39. S. V.	538.8%	538.8%	538.8%				2 512 5	45.578.8% From 150.00	- FT A A A	538.8%	538.8%	573.6%	538.8%	538.8%	M. 538.8%	528.8K	572.24	498	538.8%	538.8%	538.8%	573.6%	538.8%
	L	8	8	4	8					-	4	8	8	8	42	8	0.00				80	8	42	8	8	**	7	9	ł	8	8	8	42	30
	198	22	288	297	399	· 1000			ã	83	?.	586	376	25	198	244	1 1	1 3			219	8	264	199	288	3		17.0	2 1	\$	343	443	231	410
7	900	88	950	85	86	8			8	8	800	009	850	,025	900	550	1.3880	88	8	į	494	500	8 004	450	675	9	8	2.55	8	025	775	900	350	925 \$
Principal	\$	w.	•	*						3.00		s	∞	0,1	. E.	u:	The San				~	\$ 1,5	*	4	9	S		2 (See 19 2	2.4.4.8	5,0	~	0,1	es	či •••
3		8	20	×	8	DUD			ž	M	99.		5	8	¥ ×	C	3	\$ \$			ည္ရ	8	××	8	8	BDC	ä	Š	ğ	202	8	ည္ထ	¥	ည
Labota	7/31/03	8/2/03	8/6/03	8/11/03	8/16/03	RARANA			E #2203	£022503	ROZUM	8/29/03	8/29/03	8/30/03	8/2/03	9/5/03			2001/6-2	A COURTS	9/19/03	9/20/03	9/23/03	9/26/03	9/26/03	Pozenos Proc	Stage .	Sans.	Spiros sepo	10/2/03	10/4/03	10/4/03	10/6/03	10/9/03
Sex. 12 Case	05-m1-167475	05-m1-120700	05-m1-106615	05-m1-167479	05-m1-159210	05-m1-155749		dialetina.	O5-m1-137878	16-105-m1-137784	Demi-10011	05-m1-102910	05-m1-127690	05-m1-141199	05-m1-137662	05-m1-156594		.06-m1-100507 .06-m1-137596	De-mi-137597*		05-m1-129962	05-m1-108018	06-m1-106291	05-m1-120701	05-m1-127689	Sant-157763	.291411-1W-90	106-mt-107474	(Demi-1288)	05-m1-135256	05-m1-156597	05-m1-53188	05-m1-137677	05-m1-119180
8	_	E	-	igus	3					4		-	-	400	-	-	1	F F	F.		ε	•		_	-		÷	§ 5.	_	, ,	=	Ε	Ε	_
Co. 27P		60411	60155	60618	80508	TCS 80804	Coord		AC, \$60652	AC : 6064	2000	TCS 60644	60639	60148	60612	60409	3	8 8	AC (60851	40.000	60471	60477	60643	80 20 20 20	60402	60513	80838	AC - 60428	2	60153	60155	60101	60419	60624
3	Ş	5	52	Y	5	TCS	Ç	2	9	å	TCS SEDE	100	3 2	25	Ş		- 2	å å	9	1 9	TCS	252	Ş V	75	25	TCS 60513	TCS #0639	á	TCS BOID	TCS 60153	15S	S	Ų	TCS

Appendix: Litigation Data

5	\$ <u>\$</u>	SeX.	SS.	2	yes	8	1	Į	Į	ij	yes	X	X8X	Xes	Xes	I.I.	2 1	2	yes	2	yes	2	2			2	Se.	yes	2	yes
1	3	3	3	₹	3	Ž	T T	1	3		3	 ₹	3	Ī	3			INW	3	₹	₹	Ē	ĺ	Ė		IDW	3	₹	₹	3
A Pue	unknown	\$ 1,259.28	unknown	\$ 1,014.94	unknown	* 00'391'E'S	S 448.00 S	Section 1	* 0000Z713	S. 1.07 G. 15	\$ 1,766.38	\$ 981.00	unknown	unknown	\$ 889.50	1 1600.00 S	To Barrier	\$ 880.71	\$ 1,679.37	PODE	unknown	\$ 482.06	S-140.20			\$ 749.29	\$ 2,115.58	unknown	\$ 1,661.75	\$ 2,544.70
P-d	2	2	2	٤	2	2		The state of			yes	8	2	2	2			yes	2	8	2	yes	100			œ	٤	2	8	2
30	>	<u>a</u>	>	ā	>	ď	ā	7	Ş	NO.	MD	3	>	3	3	3 5 6	1 4 5	QX X	3	۵	>	3	3			2	2	<u>a</u>	3	긥
	35	216	320	162	\$	240	8	800	8	1360	350	320	250	320	320	8 9	3 KJ 8	38	350	139	162	20	8		8 8	ş	276	156	217	జ్ఞ
	•	•	**	**	•	•	*		4		*	•	•	•	•	2.2	1.1	_	•	~	**	*				_	•	*	**	"
	\$ 548	\$ 1,043	\$ 6,784	\$ 853	\$ 361) (7	7	088		\$ 1,416	\$ 631	\$ 1,418	\$ 718	\$ 590		70.0	\$ 531	\$ 1,679	\$ 262	\$ 1,082	\$ 382				849 849	\$ 1,840	\$ 1,040	\$ 1,445	\$ 2,845
To a second	9/13/2005	5/4/05	incomplete	2/2/05	8/17/05	30108	- EG17205	SC11.05	4.673(2005)	30002576	9/13/2005	5/31/2005	9/13/2005	4/27/2006	9/13/2005	2728/2006		7/12/2005	incomplete	5/11/05	8/25/05	5/5/05	90100		9 (0)	5/11/05	5/17/05	3725/05	1/12/05	incomplete
Rock	no data	0	no data	0	0	70	1		3			no data	no data		no data			no data		0	-		91	9		0	0	0	0	no data
Sec. 1	42 573.6%	30 538.8%	42 573.6%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	AS 80 638.8%	Part 5 573.0%	Sec. 00.00	SOLUTION OF STREET	40 575 CH	42 573.6%	42 573.6%	42 573.6%	42 573.6%	42 573.6%	2010 OF 18		42 573.6%		30 538.8%	30 376.6%	30 538.8%	N9 969 OF TO			30 538.8%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	286 85.1%
	198	443	198	343	111	803	198	9	7	1	523	231	523	330	215	8 8	X E	330	198	376	232	332	100			199	265	319	465	930
1107-01	300	1,000	300	775	250	(S) (S)	CONTRACTOR	Section 1		Les .	793	350	793	2009	325	100		005	900	958	750	750	1505¥			450	1,275	121	1,050	1,500
	<u></u>	•	٠,	•	•	70.00					<u>-</u>	*	**	•	<u>~</u>	5 G	ا ما ما	_	•	•	•	•	•	-		-	<u> </u>	•	**	-
	×						V	100							×			W.				50	- 5							¥
	10/16/03	10/17/03	10/17/03	10/18/03	10/28/03	SILVERING	A MANAGEMENTS	THE PERSON	2000	**************************************	11/15/03	11/17/03	11/19/03	11/26/03	11/28/03	Supplies.	Sippeds Tenens	12/20/D3	12/30/03	1/29/04	2/13/04	2/24/04	1000	1016		3/31/04	4/2/04	4/9/04	4/15/04	4/16/04
	f 05-m1-167481	f 05-m1-129739	f 05-m1-167449	f 05-m1-106610	f 05-m1-156599	m *** (femt-120718	nd Osmiciana	Catalogue Alles 20	San Deserved at 1865.	(A.m. () Sample (167472)	f 05-m1-167443	f 05-m1-137670	n 05-m1-166552	f 06-m1-133182	u 05-m1-167461	- 4	n % 26-mi-161399 m % 26-mi-162016	m 05-mt-15024		n 05-m1-131592	u 05-m1-151391	f 05-m1-129960	fest (45-m1-12069)	(* pentante	1, 2006-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-16-00-11-	u 05-m1-131578		m 05-m1-119162	f 05-m1-102038	f 06-m1-100502
	1 =	1	ຂ	6	4	1.68	2000 2000	8	4	 	88	19	32	15			TO SECURE	3 ½		8	18	8	8	8	Market Control	£			8	3
Co NZP	80644					147	AC 80819	Canal Series	AC BORTS	AC - ROBIE	60466							ROODS				\$ 60130	TCS (80525	300 SO	TCS. 80819	TCS 80154			5 60438	80064
3	¥	S	Ş	TCS	3	Ž.	٤	. ?		3	¥	¥	Š	¥	V	53	22	و ا	¥	S	75	TCS	Ğ.	ğ.	ច្ច ជ	S S S	TCS	3	T _S	¥

Appendix: Litigation Data

5 % £	Sec.	<u>8</u>	2	2	8			Ł	Į	C	٤	88	yes	2	2	MARK	. 1 1		Xes.	yes	Se X	\$ 8	8	2	8	2	! .]	¥98	٤	88	88	MAS
3	<u> </u>	3	₹	3							ī,	3	3	₩	3	THE STATE OF	33		3	Ξ	3	3	3	3	Ī	j	1	3	⋽	3	<u></u>	7
\$ 698.57	\$ 676.35	\$ 599.29	\$ 1,630.38	\$ 2,280.51					Thomas .		none	unknown	\$ 1,672.58	\$ 2,323.00	\$ 2,684.07	DC TLO G 3	6.1.078.68 5.1.886.69	in Pariori	unknown	\$ 1,410.39	\$ 2,826.23	none	\$ 1,922.39	Tarous (**)	5000	2 (549.56)		unknown	none	none	unknown	*******
2	Xex	yes	2	2							92	2	Sex.	yes	yes		44.8		8	5	2	٤	2	8	E	464		٤	5	2	8	
<u>a</u>	3	8	<u>o</u> .	<u>_</u>	C			Ä	**	0.00	DFLP	>	2	3	2	C	5 5 1	Į,	2	2	-	ω	2	BE	3	3	a (:	2	۵	8	>	i
5 5	108	8	213	238	Lane L		5 5	S E	88	WIL.	173	350	298	303	350	- TOEL		9	350	\$	350	350	52 5	907	8	3		320	8	249	127	
S 599	\$ 569	\$ 649	\$ 1,418	\$ 1,983					1011		196 \$	\$ 2,370	\$ 1,984	\$ 2,020	\$ 2,373	The state of the s	egil T		\$ 655	\$ 1,226	\$ 2,941	\$ 2,041	\$ 1,672	122.			7887	\$ 1,671	\$ 617	\$ 1,659	\$ 848	
5/23/05	5/17/05	2/2/05	2/2/05	6/2/05	(Troope		G07210.32	90/11/6	SE BUTANE	AND 6/405	5/4/05	incomplete	5/4/05	2724/05	incomplete	- Constant	8 8	94625	6/2/2006	5/17/05	incomplete	incomplete	5/11/05	42705	901103-43	- Andrews		3/30/2006	7728/05	6/2/05	8/17/05	-
Root	-	ო	60	0		3		104	TO O		0	no data	-	٥	no data				no data	0	no data	no data	7	7.5	. O.		8	no data		0	7	
30 538.8%	30 568.3%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	No comment			*8'85 OF \$8	West, 538.8%	A 100 CO. 100	30 538.8%	266 83.4%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	182 245.7%		A 100 CA		182 245.7%	30 538.8%	180 246.1%	180 471.7%	30 538.8%	7.80 638.8%	AF 30, 6840%	15 20 00 1E	A 1 500 100 100	180 246.1%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	30 538.8%	
244	244	- 188	83	609		2	8	018	k		355	419	609	620	845			8	845	376	838	838	513	122	3	8	89	838	240	88	82	_
References S	\$ 521	\$	\$ 1,312	1,375	4000			00.00 mg 9	A 100 - 400 -		900	069	\$ 1.375	1,400	069				069	820	069	360	1,159	2009		097.41		069	295	1,150	288	
3 202	8	8	20	2		?	0	Av. 113	00			.	- DO	8	×		Wei 200	38	_	20	×	×	8	8	8	*	*	WA W	2	8	8	-
4/23/04	4/27/04	4/30/04	4/30/04	5/6/04			T TOOMS	10714	Carcina		5/28/04	5/28/04	5/29/04	6/1/04	6/5/04	5			6/24/04	6/28/04	6/30/04	1/1/04	7/6/04	- TH204	TO MAN	TOTAL PROPERTY.	STEEDS.	7728/04	7/27/04	7/30/04	4011617	
05-m1-135258	n 05-m1-113551	05-m1-106605	05-m1-106608				4,06-m1-457312	# 45 min 114.85	A . T. Demistration		05-m1-129738	06-m1-100505	05-m1-129736	05-m1-110707	05-m1-137804	SOCIETY OF STREET	68-11-10-10-10-10-10-10-10-10-10-10-10-10-		06-m1-143479	05-m1-133550	06-m1-100503	05-m1-137777	05-m1-131574	m:	- 589161-114-95-(%	18.00m1400512	3,05-m1,137700	08-m1-125314			05-m1-156576	
Case	80104	60443	60107	60194 m	. 8	<u>.</u>	88	<u>8</u>	Marine.	50.07:-90	80074	60649	60612	60646	80563	<u> </u>	-6.359	A granden	80808	80626	60652 f	60429	60162 u	60623 ×m	88 98	55000	2300	60612			60120 u	_
Ce 2							TCS - 80629	TCS 20066	TCS 40120		7 8€					4		CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF THE	AC 60608				TCS 80	TCS BO	2 2	5		AC 60				

Appendix: Litigation Data

B-504 PDC 5 1,000 5 443 20 58.8						385 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1																						
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,	yes or	<u>¥</u>	<u>¥</u>	Ž.				<u> </u>	<u> </u>	Ž	<u>ĕ</u>	Š.			Š	Ĕ	ž.	Š.	₹		À		₹.	ž	<u>¥</u>	<u>¥</u>	5	7
1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	<u> </u>	3	3	Ē		Ì		₹	3	Ē	3	∑			3	Ξ	E	2	ī)W		ij	Ī	3	₹	3	3	<u>5</u>	
1,000 PDC 5 1,000 5 443 30 538.8% 1 81/1705 5 1,443 5 216 DJ 84/04 WA 5 690 5 645 182 245.7% 10 0 81/1705 5 1,443 5 216 DJ 94/04 WA 5 690 5 645 182 245.7% 10 0 81/1705 5 649 5 700 U U 87/04 PDC 5 450 5 162 245.7% 10 0 81/1705 5 649 5 700 U U 87/04 PDC 5 450 5 162 30 538.8% 0 81/1705 5 649 5 700 U U PDC 24/1705	\$ 871.12 unknown	\$ 721.43	\$ 1,122.53	\$ 3,317.00		T. C. L.	5208282	unknown	unknown	unknown	\$ 1,772.55	\$ 1,327.43	\$ 1,510.20 \$ 2,500.24	\$1,006.89 William	\$ 1,338.07	\$ 1,230.43	unknown	none	\$ 2,326.30		\$ 1,783.73	\$2,000.08	\$ 448.80	unknown	none	unknown	\$ 1,659.28	
Second Picc Second Sec	2 2	2	2	٤			2 2	2	2	2	yes	sex	E.	L	sex.	2	5	2	٤	a de la companya de l	9		2	2	2	2	2	F
March Marc	<u>-</u> ⊃	3	<u>-</u>	3	e s	9	a =	>	>	>	Ø ¥	3	d a	à	2	3	>	60	3		1.1	3 8	F.	-	DFLP	=	3	
1. D. D. S. C. C. C. C. C. C. C	350	2	46	350	3 §	8	28.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0	179	495	320	320	173	N. S		738	173	320	350	350	88 1	8		8	\$	350	350	216	
1-0.014	• •	49	•	*				••	•	**	•	~	. 4.		•	•	-	•		2.1			•	•	•	**	*	
1.0 Details Marchinet	\$ 758 \$ 1,392	\$ 721	\$ 974	\$ 2,968				\$ 1,190	\$ 1,299	\$ 543	\$ 1,423	\$ 1,154			\$ 1,587	\$ 1,057	\$ 2,248	\$ 2,006	\$ 2,114	\$ 11.446 Section 1	S. 4.56		\$ 649	\$05	\$ 1,713	\$ 6,784	\$ 1,443	A Description
State Parceles State S	8/20/05	505	Š	90	3 . F	8	9 8	Š	8	8	8	8	8 9	4 9	302	202	ete	ag ege	96	8 8	8	8 1	305	Š	ete	<u> </u>	92	1
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	8/20/05 incomplete	28	à	STEEL		W	7.4	7/13	7/13	67272	9/13/2	8	8		712	7112	dwoouj	incomp	dwaoni	A SECTION	74.7	62	8	8/17	incomp	incomp	6,1%	T. Commercial
84304 PDC 5 1,000 5 443 30 8 845 182 84504 WA 5 690 5 428 288 84604 PDC 5 1,000 5 428 288 84604 PDC 5 1,000 5 428 288 84604 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 30 84504 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 30 84504 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 30 84504 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 30 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 30 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 30 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 1,240 5 1,240 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 1,240 5 1,240 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 1,240 5 1,	no data	0	0	no data			0	0	. •				2 (8)		0	0						7	0	_			Ŀ	
84304 PDC 5 1,000 5 443 30 8 845 182 84504 WA 5 690 5 428 288 84604 PDC 5 1,000 5 428 288 84604 PDC 5 1,000 5 428 288 84604 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 30 84504 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 30 84504 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 30 84504 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 30 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 30 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 30 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 199 5 199 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 1,240 5 1,240 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 1,240 5 1,240 5 199 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 1,240 5 1,	538.8%	5.5%	8.8%	5.1%			3	3%	8.8%	3.4%	5.7%	8.8%			8.8%	8.8%	5.1%	5.1%	5.1%				8.8%	%8.8X	5. <u>1</u> 8	5.7%	8.8%	00
84504 PDC 5 1,000 5 443 84504 WA 5 690 5 845 84604 PDC 5 350 5 199 84604 PDC 5 350 5 199 84604 PDC 5 350 5 199 84704 PDC 5 350 5 199 848004 PDC 5 1,000 5 620 84704 PDC 5 1,000 5 826 97204 PDC 5 1,000 5 845 97204 PDC 5 1,000 5 845 97204 PDC 5 1,000 5 845 97204 PDC 5 1,000 5 354 97204 PDC 5 1,000 5 356 97204 PDC 5 1,000 5 356 97204 PDC 5 1,000 5 369 10/204 PDC 5 1,000 5 369 11/1304 PDC 5 1,000 5 1,240	8 8									89	2 2	ශ් ස								2 5		9 9 9 9			, eo	بة 2	8	
8:304 PDC 5 1,000 5 8 8:404 WA 5 690 5 8 8:604 PDC 5 1,000 5 8 8:604 PDC 5 1,000 5 8 8:604 PDC 5 1,000 5 8:01304 PDC 5 1,000 5 8:01304 PDC 5 1,000 5 8:01304 PDC 5 1,100 5 8:0204 PDC 5 1,100 5 1,100 5 8:0204 PDC 5 1,100											_						~ ×					40						
8:304 PDC 8 8:404 WA 8 8:604 PDC 8 8:604 PDC 8 8:604 PDC 8 8:604 PDC 8 8:704 PDC 8 8:704 WA 8 8:704 PDC 8 9:704 PDC 8 10/204 PDC 8 10/204 PDC 8 11/1304 PDC 8 11/1304 PDC 8 11/1304 PDC 8	\$ 233 \$ 845	\$ 121	\$ 28	\$1,240			3	\$ 365	399	\$ 419	845	33		8	\$ 487	354	\$ 620	\$ 838	\$ 620	3 8			\$ 199	\$ 155	\$ 428	845	\$ 443	1
83304 PDC 5 84404 WA 5 84504 WA 5 84504 PDC 5 84704 PDC 5 871004 PDC 5 871004 PDC 5 87204 WA 5 87204 WA 5 87204 WA 5 87204 PDC 5 97204 PDC 5 97204 PDC 5 97204 PDC 5 97204 PDC 6 972004 PDC 6 10/8004 PDC 6 11/11304 WA 5 11/11304 PDC 6 11/2304 PDC 6	525	8	22	8	8 :	1 6	X S	55	8	8	8	8	188	8 8	8	8	8	8	8	12 8		بر ج ج	S	S _S	8	8	8	1
	60 60 60 60	S	8	\$ 2,0				₩,	6	. 		8			1.1	. 60			1.0				~ •	•	. w		2	When and
	PDC W	8	꼺	۸×	5	12	8	200	2	×	×	8		8	8	5	Š	XX		8		8	PDC	8	×	*	202	
	12/9/04	12/3/04	11/16/04	11/13/04	(Depty)	101208	10/12/01	10/8/04	10/2/01	9/27/04	9/24/04	9724/04	1000	District	9/7/04	9/3/04	8/27/04	8/20/04	8/18/04	AUSTIN .	7031/30	1000	8/7/04	8/6/04	8/5/04	8/4/04	2005/8	
1384 E 8 4 4 5 2 8 2	3 %	 g	-2	92			3 1	25	 8		. g	-		. 9	6	<u> </u>			200		E	N :	5	82	: S	. 0		
1 图 to	05-m1-157754	05-m1-153173	05-m1-153172	06-m1-100908	DS-mil-158679 object attributed		05-m1-149124	05-m1-147509	1475	<u>\$</u>	166	14 75			05-m1-147219	05-m1-147218	1005	1377	137	25002 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2		D6-m1,14177	05-m1-154513	585	1377	1674	1565	1
05-m1-156577 05-m1-167449 05-m1-164513 05-m1-154513 05-m1-154513 05-m1-137789 05-m1-137789 05-m1-137789 05-m1-147218 05-m1-147218 05-m1-147514 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509 05-m1-147509	Ė	Ė	FE.	Ē	1	ŧŧ	Ī	Ė	Ė	Ė	Ė	Ė		ËÌ	Ė	Ė	Ė	Ė	, ,	Ē	j	Ē	Ė	Ē		į	Ė	1
**************************************		8	පි	8			8	පි	8	8	6 8	8		4 4	8	8	\$ 8	;	8	8 3		ğ.,	8	8	5 5	5. 8	8	1000
EE-AF-A-EE	E 6	=	*	Ļ			5.	<u>ب</u>	-	-	· E		* *	- 10	<u> </u>	-	3	· E		Alex.		7	~	E .	· E			
TCS 60620 TCS 60620	60621	60644	60634	80620			9	6015	8 9 9	909	80618	90.		8	6065	6064	60618	60415				8	6062;	5015	60615	60625	8	
ឌី ឌី ភ	₹ 10°				8	3 2	2	2	35	Ų		25	}	<u> </u>			٧		Ş	2 2	1 8	32					2	

Appendix: Litigation Data

Ę	Xe.	XeX	Xex	\$ 0	yes.	Ł	Ž		lor J. Garage		yes	X8X	2	Xex	yes	٤.	8	L	1
	3	3	3	3	3	Ĭ	Ī			ŧ	3	3	∑	Ī	3	Ī	1	ã	
A STATE OF	\$ 1,798.77	\$ 1,815.40	unknown	unknown	unknown	T. CLOS					\$ 1,605.11	unknown	unknown	\$ 2,568.94	unknown		I		
	<u>*</u>	2.1.2	S	S	5	2					5	5	5	\$ 2.	5	t.	F		
TOTAL STORY	sex.	yes	2	2	2	2					2	2	2	2	2	8	•	1	
JO.	QM	8	>	>	∍	7	1				3	⇒	>	-,	5	7	-	'n	. T
	350	350	350	350	350	350	15				350	350	350	350	350	038		3	Ę
	*	٠ ٠	4	*	**						* 2	~	49	5	2	3	• 6	1	1
	* 1. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	\$ 1,565	\$ 6,784	\$ 6,784	\$ 6,784	5.6.8					\$ 1,652	\$ 2,027	\$ 796	\$ 2,569	\$ 772	\$ 2,669			0.00
Breed to the Councidate All Dances Santa Council	9/13/2005 \$ 1,449	9/13/2005 \$	incomplete \$	eteldmooni	incomplete \$	S and concern	S SOUNDS				incomplete \$	8/2/2006	6/2/2006	s eteldmooni	6/2/2006		200000	S STORY	Section 2
2	6																÷		(35.7
		S da	no da	8	29 20		CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF		2		no da	no da	85.3% Ino data	no da	ap ou	1 2	2	MA SEL ING HOL	Ė
207	37	**	182 152.0% no data	245.7% no data	245.7% no data	152 OK	1		182 74 (2)	102.152.0m	182 152.0% no data	182 152.0% no data	85.3%	no data	182 152.0% no data	208 1 \$5.3%	182 166.4% Industri		Section Section (Sec.)
	8	8	182	182	182	182					182	182	997	\$ 147 no data no data no data	182	88	100		1
	820	838	523	845	25.	C			8	3 ;	758	758	\$1.243	147	523	8	į	1	Ĺ
	9 4	49	•	•	41				1.8		"	•				- 70% - 448 - 448	25.25.000	Cont.	
	000	96	9	8	069	ROO			3		1 000	000	2.000	300	9	8			
	5		-	4	- 41						-	• •	•	•	•		•		1
100	×				WA	777			Ĭ		×					X		ŧ	1
	40705	5/2/05	5/3/05	5/27/05	5/31/05	CARONE			- F/18.05	190124	RURINE	7/1/05	7/11/05	8/1/05	8/11/05	£28.05 m	SUBVER		AC JERRED ST. DR. HESTON DESCRIPTION
*	Of.m1-187474	05-m1-166547	05-m1-167449	05-m1-167449	05-m1-167449	487.440			1		05-m1-100508	06-m1-143482	06-m1-143498	06-m1-125387	06-m1-143475	195367			
				9	, e	AC WOOD 61 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10			TATE DESCRIPTION OF	ACBOR28() Sept. 430414	Sem 1				8	AC #80827 (#86-mil (26387	Control of the Contro		Action of the second
	3	-				1			T.			- +							
	AC 60640 m	AC 60429	60620	AC 60620	60620	0000			AC BOOK		AC BORTE	AC 60621	60104	60827	60820	2808			
7	9 4	۲) (۷	٧	2 0		1	9	ġ:	٤	۲	۷	ک د	٧	2	t) g


SFGate.com

Return to regular view

Print This Article

Poor pay more for services, study says
S.F. has high density of check cashers
- Leslie Fulbright, Chronicle Staff Writer
Tuesday, July 18, 2006





(07-18) 04:00 PST Washington -- Low-income residents of 13 cities across the nation pay extra for many everyday services, sometimes thousands of dollars more over a whole year, a study to be released today shows.

By taking out higher-interest mortgages, shopping at rent-to-own furniture stores, using check-cashing businesses instead of banks and buying groceries at convenience stores, the nation's working poor households pay much more than moderate- and high-income households for life's essentials, says the Brookings Institution study, which analyzed services in San Francisco, Oakland and 11 other cities.

The report -- "From Poverty, Opportunity: Putting the Market to Work for Lower-Income Families" -- calls on government officials to create laws to curb services that gouge low-income consumers, and it proposes reproducing fledgling programs the authors found across the country.

Matt Fellowes, the report's main author, praised San Francisco's new push for mainstream financial services in poorer areas as an example.

"Reducing the fees by just 1 percent would add up to \$6.5 billion in new spending power for the families," said Fellowes, a senior research associate at Brookings.

"It would enable low- and modest-income residents to save for and invest in assets, like homes and retirement savings or pay for child expenses like health care and education," Fellowes said.

Among the cities Brookings studied, San Francisco stood out most for its high concentration of short-term loan providers and check-cashing businesses -- where customers pay \$5 to \$50 to cash a check. Its poor neighborhoods have the second-highest concentration per capita. Seattle's are first.

In San Francisco, you are nearly five times more likely to find a check-cashing business in a poor area than any other neighborhood. In the Tenderloin, the city's poorest area, there are 10 check-cashing businesses, where the annual percentage rate can top 390 percent. In Pacific Heights, a rich neighborhood, there are none.

Check cashers charge 2 percent or more to cash a payroll check; banks allow deposits for free. Payday lenders, who offer cash for a consumer's own post-dated check, charge 500 percent-plus in annual interest.

"Check cashing and payday lending are probably the biggest financial impediments facing low-income people," said Kevin Stein, associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition. "It is a huge problem in San Francisco."