the fights, listening to the cars screeching, listening and watching the cars going up and down the street doing wheelies in the corners, the bikes doing wheelies, the bikes illegally parked. They were able to, at that very moment, simultaneously e-mail the alderman, and that all came into the record. And those were the basis of the complaints and those were the basis of the findings of fact. And they testified to those things.

So the question becomes, was there any evidence upon which the Common Council could come to the conclusion that this tavern was operating just plain as a problem to the neighborhood, whether or not it was an improper house, which is the statutory standard, or whether or not it was creating neighborhood problems, which is the standard under the ordinances of the City of Milwaukee, such that its license to operate should be stopped.

None of those facts were ever challenged by this licensee or by counsel who was representing him at the time. We have here a bar that was literally operating out of control at closing time and its patrons and what they were doing to the neighbors.

Now the record also before the Utilities and Licenses Committee, and that's the same record that was before the Common Council, demonstrates that the

neighbors just didn't one day decide they had it with

Mr. DeSautel and they were going to shut the place down.

They put up with this for a period of three years.

Various things were tried.

25.

For example, at one point the live music portion of his cabaret license was taken away in the belief that that was going to solve the problem.

Mr. DeSautel tried to get it back. And at one point, I think the Common Council may have given it back to him, but the problems continued. And at closing time --

MR. ARENA: Judge, I -- I really have to object to arguments of counsel. I thought the prehearing discussion was that we were going to talk about the legal issues. And, very skillfully, Mr. Schrimpf wants to have you hear about all these dirty little details that were testified to, which is, quite frankly, the issue that will be determined by this Court on review and is irrelevant at this point.

THE COURT: Well, his argument is, there is also an argument of whether or not the plaintiff is -the evidence is -- likelihood is that the plaintiff will strongly -- strong likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of the case when it goes forward.

And so it's relevant. But I will let you know I'm at this point more interested in the procedure of how

the decision was made because even if there is a basis to support it and the hearing was not a fair hearing, then I don't even get to the likelihood of prevailing on a basis to suspend or revoke. And the question is, is -- I'm more focused on at the moment is the likelihood of prevailing that the hearing itself was not a fair and impartial hearing.

25 -

MR. SCHRIMPF: Okay. Your Honor, I don't think counsel has demonstrated that there was any bias in this hearing. For example, at Page 126 of what would be Exhibit 10C to the affidavit of Copeland and sometimes referred to as Volume One, something came up with one of the witnesses who was testifying about having underaged people within the bar.

And at Page 126, starting at Line 5 and going through Line 13, I specifically cautioned the committee that nothing with respect to underage people was part of the complaint and, in any event, under State law, one episode of an underaged individual in the bar would not be enough to take any action.

So I, in my role at that point, am cautioning the committee that, look, this is not something which is part of the complaint and even though, yes, it was brought in by some of the people who are here testifying, you do not consider that.

1 I don't know that a subpoena to a police 2 officer who doesn't show up in response to the subpoena 3 and, by the way, Mr. Arena had a similar problem. subpoenaed some police officers who didn't show up --4 5 I don't know that that is the basis of any finding. 6 MR. ARENA: My cop did show up. 7 MR. SCHRIMPF: Well, he didn't testify, did 8 he? .9 MR. ARENA: Yeah, he did. 10 MR. SCHRIMPF: Oh. Anyway, I don't know that 11 that's a basis of a finding that there was any kind of 12 bias in this case. With respect to other taverns --13 Well, let's stay in the beginning THE COURT: 14 with why, if the ordinance provides that the city 15 attorney shall present the evidence, didn't the city 16 attorney's office present the evidence before the 17 Utilities Committee? By tradition, we do not present 18 MR. SCHRIMPF: 19 the evidence. By tradition, we just let the people 20 testify because -- and it's -- it's done for the very practical reason that there is -- that we don't want to 21 get into the problem of showing some sort of bias at the 22 23 committee hearing because we are cast in the role of both advising the committee as well as, according to the -- to 24

the ordinance, presenting evidence.

25

1 THE COURT: All right. Then let's move on to the second issue. If that's not the -- although the 2 ordinance would say that you do, and there is an argument 3 4 or interpretation as to whether or not you're required to 5 do it, and you're saying, traditionally, the city 6 attorney does not. It's the public is left to --7 MR. SCHRIMPF: That's right. 8 THE COURT: -- their own straits to make that 9 presentation. Why then is there a role for Alderman Pawlinski's aide in this hearing? 10 11 MR. SCHRIMPF: Alderman --THE COURT: Is that -- Miss Hawks is his aide? 12 MR. SCHRIMPF: Oh, Miss Hawks is his aide and 13 14 Miss Hawks did testify. Again, this is something that 15 traditionally is done. The Common Council members do 16 have their aides testify before the committee. 17 It seems to me, your Honor, that if, in fact, 18 the statute, and I'm talking about Chapter 125 -- would 19 prohibit an alderman from sitting in decision-making roles, then that should be something that should be 20 21 specified within Chapter 125. 22 No, but you -- at some point during THE COURT: the hearing, Alderman Pawlinski starts to testify. 23 24 you cut him off and say, you're not in a position to be 25 testifying.

MR. SCHRIMPF: That is correct.

. 6

2 THE COURT: And in that setting, the question 3 is how is the aide not an extension of the alderman under 4 those specific circumstances?

MR. SCHRIMPF: I don't think the aide for that purpose -- well, I don't think the aide for that purpose is an extension of the alderman. The aide has -- what will normally happen in these cases is that the aide is handling the e-mails that are going back and forth and the correspondence that's going in and out. And sometimes the aide is the individual that has the most direct and personal knowledge of what is transpiring.

THE COURT: All right, what's troubling me is the reference before that was made of, "we'll call our first witness." And it's Miss Hawks making that statement. It seems to be, I'm not just here as a witness. I have a more active role to play that I am prosecuting this case.

MR. SCHRIMPF: Well, but, your Honor, if you will -- if you will check the transcript, you will find out that Miss Hawks after that when she called the first witness, if that's what you want to call it, thereafter, did not actually examine the witnesses. They just testified. She was in the role of coordinating who was going first.

There is no indication that she in any way was conforming the testimony, that she was advising, or that she was in any way controlling the testimony. In fact, if you read the transcript, and I'm sure you will, you will find out that the aldermen are asking questions left and right of various witnesses and occasionally out of order. Occasionally, they will ask other witnesses who have previously testified about something, or in the middle of proceedings — and I know this happened in this case — they ask counsel something or Mr. DeSautel himself something. There is no evidence that somehow or other, the — the alderman was biased in this particular case, certainly not within the realm of the City of Cedarburg case.

THE COURT: All right. You can continue.

MR. SCHRIMPF: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

Well, in summation, all I want to point out -- I made, basically, my arguments in the briefs. All I want to point out is that I don't think there is any evidence that there was any bias in this case.

I think if there were evidence that there were bias in this case, you would have a decision that did not comport to the facts that were before the committee.

And on that point, I would like to point out the statements of two individuals at the Common Council

meeting. I might note that all of the individuals who 1 2 Mr. Arena identified as speaking before the Common Council are themselves, I believe, first term alderman. 3 4 MR. ARENA: I'll object. That's irrelevant. 5 MR. SCHRIMPF: The suggestion being --THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection, but --6 7 MR. SCHRIMPF: Thank you. The suggestion 8 being, your Honor, that no injustice to them, but they 9 don't have a whole lot of history with the Milwaukee Common Council. But two individuals spoke who have a 10 great deal of history with the Milwaukee Common Council. 11 12 At Page 53 of that proceeding, one was Alderwoman Breier. 13 THE COURT: I'm sorry, what page? 14 MR. SCHRIMPF: Alderman Breier at Page 53, 15 starting at Line 12: 16 Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. First of all, I'd like to say that I have about 100 licenses in my 17 18 district. I sat on U&L for four years, and I agree with 19 Alderman Pawlinski and others who have said that I don't believe we should have to wait until something escalates, 20 21 until there's shootings and knifings and whatever else 22 going on. 23 I had the misfortune in my district a number of 24 years ago when I sat on the committee of a bar on Howell 25 that didn't take three years to escalate to that point,

but there was a shooting with blood dripping from the front steps, and the place did close down. And maybe this is an unfit location in a neighborhood that's pretty residential all around it. I know where it is. I've been by it. I can tell you this is not what I would want for my district. Therefore, I — or for my immediate neighborhood, and, therefore, I am supporting Alderman Pawlinski today. Thank you.

And Alderman Pawlinski had made a motion before the Common Council to substitute the recommendation of the committee of a 20-day suspension which, incidentally, was recommended by counsel himself at the conclusion of the U&L meeting, to a revocation.

The other individual that I think is interesting is Alderman D'Amato. On Page 66, Alderman D'Amato represents, and the Court can take official notice that Alderman D'Amato represents the east side of Milwaukee where there are many, many taverns. Thank you Mr. President -- Page 66, starting at Line 5:

Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to comment. I want to begin by first taking exception, there was something -- something that was said by Mr. DeSautel's attorney, that the items included in the findings of fact should be accepted by the people who live in the city as, quote, "city living," close quote.

I have the opportunity to represent two of the most vibrant entertainment districts in the city, and I will tell you that I have not seen as I quote from the findings of fact, "five or six other officers walking around with handguns and shotguns out, several people handcuffed and put in police cars," close quote. I've never seen that happen. And, in fact, that isn't city living. That's what gives city living a bad name. That's what people think the city is, and the city is not that.

It seems to me when we approve a license, and especially a license that has live music or a cabaret, we make a deal not only with the owner of that and operator of that bar, we make a deal with the neighbors. And that deal is that as long as the establishment is run right, and as long as it's not a disturbance and adds value to the neighborhood, doesn't detract from it, then they can continue to operate.

And with what -- the neighbors, we say, and we always say this, it's almost in every U&L meeting, if you have a problem, observe. Take down license plate numbers. Do your homework. Make sure you document everything that happens.

It's a very strange thing about this Council and the committee; it seems that we penalize those who do

that. Those -- these people have gone on for the last year, if not three years, documenting what they've seen. They've done their homework. They've done what we asked of them. Yet, we're not going to give them the ability to control the destiny of their own neighborhood. They have investments there. They deserve that.

And I think that the best comment on the floor was made by Alderman Breier that perhaps this is an unfit location.

It seems to me, Mr. President, your account about Spice Island and some others, every time we have revocation hearings, it comes with the old corner bars, in this case, an old bowling alley that served the neighborhood, that had become a kind of a regional dance club or regional attractions. They're unfit, not because they have a license, but they're unfit because they now run an operation that's not conducive to the neighborhood.

If you think back to those -- at those places, what we've done is we've taken these neighborhood bars and have escalated them to something that's much bigger than the neighborhood can handle now. I do think that we should stand behind these neighbors because we made a promise to them that this place was not going to be a disturbance. But it is a disturbance. And one of them

has to go. And I would hope that it's not the 44 neighbors that have to go.

And then, finally, Alderman Nardelli, who was chairman of the Utilities and Licenses Committee, also on Page 68, starting at Line 20:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You know, one of the principles of, having served on the Utilities and Licenses Committee, one of the principles we should always try to adhere to, and we as council obviously have to as well, and that's consistency — one of the issues raised by Mr. Arena. I can't control it, and then there was a problem with people hearing him. Dropping down to Line 8:

The fact that I will take you back just a little bit to history that took place when I first came on the council, it's longer -- more than half of your lives. But at that time -- some of you, anyway -- and at that time there was a license problem on the east side which had, I think, three or four different hearings. And it was only after the residents, who were the complainants in all of the prior hearings, only after they had formally documented all of the incidents, that the license, in fact, was revoked. And there were no police complaints. It was strictly citizen complaints. The license was revoked, and the judge at that time,

Circuit Judge Janine Geske, did not issue a temporary restraining order. In the end the license location was closed. It was closed because the constituents came together and brought three, and only three people to testify, and they testified extremely well to having witnessed people going into this location, coming out, publicly urinating, throwing up in the mailboxes, and then goes on and on.

Your Honor, I don't think there's been any bias shown on the part of Alderman Pawlinski. There has been no bias shown on the part of myself. There has been no bias shown that this decision was prejudged.

What has been shown is that you had a concerned alderman who was getting a lot of information about this location from his constituents, and he was doing what aldermen are supposed to do. He was holding meetings and he was telling the neighbors what has to get done.

And if the neighbors have trouble forming things into a complaint, yeah, the City Attorney's Office assisted them in forming the complaint. But that doesn't mean we were testifying. That doesn't mean we were biased. That doesn't mean we were coming to some sort of a decision in this case. I'm not a voter on that committee, and I never advised -- you check this transcript and I'll tell for the record, I never advised

this committee what the result should be, whether it should be a suspension or anything else. In fact, I routinely tell the Council members that what punishment they hand out is reposed to their sound discretion. And I don't care if that's a 10-day suspension, a zero, or a revocation. That's up to them.

I will assist people in getting their complaints in the proper form, make sure that they allege the stuff that's got to get alleged if such facts exist. And I will assist the committee in rulings on evidence, and that's what I was doing here. But there was no bias shown. And I wasn't a decision-maker, and you check this transcript. They never asked me for any kind of decision. They never asked me whether or not something should be received into the record or not.

The only time that I interjected myself is at one point where I said, you're not supposed to testify, and the other point when I came along and said that there was some evidence that was received into the record that I told them specifically they could not use in their deliberations. That's hardly bias. And even if it is bias, it certainly isn't bias towards Mr. DeSautel.

I think, your Honor, that the record that's before you, one, does not show bias, certainly not under the standards as set forth in the <u>Cedarburg</u> case that

1 counsel has introduced; two, is ample evidence of why the 2 Common Council should have exercised its discretion in 3 the manner it did.

And I didn't care personally if it -- if it would have dismissed the case or if it would have sustained a 20-day suspension, which counsel himself agreed to at the committee meeting, suggested, in fact, to the committee.

And I don't care if it ultimately would have wound up as a revocation or Alderman Bohl's suggestion, if you read the transcript, by the way, just before that part where Alderman Bohl takes off after Alderman Pawlinski, he himself recommended -- or recommended a 75-day suspension. I believe that's on the preceding page or two.

So it seems to me, your Honor, that counsel has not demonstrated, one, that there is likelihood of success; and, two, that there is any bias in this record. And it seems to me that the decision of the Common Council must be affirmed.

THE COURT: You didn't address the allegation of the discriminatory enforcement.

MR. SCHRIMPF: Your Honor, I was thinking of introducing an affidavit in this proceeding, and I didn't know if this issue was going to come up or not, so I did

not. But I chuckled when I read that allegation. I'll
tell you why I chuckled -- because there is a proceeding
before Judge Flanagan involving Mr. Stanley Gordon, doing
business as Spice Island, which is -- was mentioned by
counsel this morning and comes up in a couple of
transcripts.

And, basically, what happened in the case of Spice Island located at 60th and North, if you want to know where the location is, is that the recommendation of the Utilities and Licenses Committee was -- and that was a nonrenewal or it was up for renewal -- it was a recommendation of renewal with a 45-day suspension -- strike that -- renewal with a 30-day suspension, the taking away of all of its entertainment licenses, and the restriction of the Class B tavern to serve this bar only, meaning that patrons can come in after the period of suspension and have a drink, but only if they're seated at a table, not standing up at a bar.

And Mr. Gordon in that proceeding specifically requested the information regarding Daddios because he thought the recommendation of a 20-day suspension on Daddios demonstrated that his punishment, if you want to use that word, by the Common Council was far too severe.

Your Honor, I get this all the time from licensees who will compare one aspect of what happened

with their license with what happened with another
license and argue that this is somehow or other
inconsistent, that it's somehow or other a violation
of due process.

Your Honor, the Common Council takes each one of these licenses on their own merits and they look at the problems and the depth of the problems.

Now, quite frankly, in the case of Spice Island, there was one episode that happened late in summer, I believe in August sometime, where there was, apparently, some gunfire from patrons exiting at or around closing time. And it was videotaped by some of the neighbors, not the gunfire itself, but the -- the congregation of patrons after they poured out of the place and the noise that was taking place. There was one episode of that involving Spice Island. And that was the recommendation of the Utilities and Licenses Committee.

There was a good deal of debate, once again, not unlike the kind of debate that has been demonstrated here this morning between the Council members as to what to do about it. And, ultimately, the Council adopted the committee recommendation.

Your Honor, the fact that there are these sorts of differences, I suggest to the Court, precludes any intelligent suggestion that so many of one kind of

violation equals this kind of a punishment. There is no such thing. It's kind of like, and I think one of the judges I was before in this circuit or in this county, stated one day to somebody who was making that kind of an argument, it's somewhat akin to what happens when a judge sits down and evaluates a sentence to be imposed upon somebody. There is all sorts of factors that you take into account that do not necessarily transfer from one case to another.

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Some of it, quite frankly, is the contrition shown by the licensee before the committee at the time that the hearing is taking place. Some of it relates to the seriousness of some of the police objections. Some of it relates to the length of time the problem has been going on. Some of it relates to the time that the licensee has been in business. If the licensee has been in business a very, very long time and you have one kind of a record, it's looked at one way. If the licensee has only been in business for one year and we have 10 -- 15 serious police objections, it's viewed quite another way, to be quite honest with you.

In this particular case, I'll be the first one to admit, there were no police objections. The police had not observed any of this stuff. And I don't think that's necessarily the fault of the Police Department.

It was the -- simply the fact that when this stuff

cocurs, it happens rather quickly. It's enough to

disturb the neighbors, and by the time a busy police

department is able to get to the scene, the problem is

gone, literally gone. The people have left.

7.

But, in the meantime, the neighbors are stood up; they're disturbed. Their sleep has been disturbed and they've witnessed the conduct. The problem is now the Police Department doesn't have anybody to nab because the person who did it is gone. So how do you deal with these kinds of problems.

In this particular case, we have a licensee who did have a track record. We have a licensee whose problems resulted in the alteration of his entertainment license in the hope that that was going to solve the problem. Well, these facts would suggest it didn't. And so the Council and the committee had to take other action.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Arena, any brief reply?

MR. ARENA: Yes, I would just like to point out Page 17 of Volume One, which I think directly goes to the bias. I specifically asked her on Page 17, I specifically asked Miss Hawks:

You're here in your capacity as working for

1 Alderman Pawlinski, correct? 2 Her answer was: Yes. 3 You are his legislative assistant? Yes. 5 This is exactly one of our points, your Honor. She was -- she had no other reason to be there, to do what she did, except in her capacity as an extension of 7 8 the alderman's office. 9 In that capacity, she supplied documentation and maps, all in a way that was contrary to any interest 10 of Mr. DeSautel, which can only be seen as one of showing 11 a complete, or showing complete bias by her in her 12 position as working for the alderman and by the alderman 13 14 himself. 15 We have the testimony of the witness today. I'll leave it stand for itself. I think there is a 16 demonstration there that there was some bias. I'll allow 17 the rest of the transcript to stand for itself, as you 18 19 can review many of the things that were said and done. 20 In regards to Mr. Schrimpf at the hearing, it's 21 never been accused by us that he advised or voted. 22 question is, what is he doing there. Is he advising or is he prosecuting. At times, he does it all. Of course, 23 he doesn't vote or make a decision, but he has a large 24 25 impact on what can happen there, and don't let him kid

1 you that he doesn't.

Secondly, he brings up Alderman D'Amato, and I will direct you to our brief. Attached to it are the records of Judges, which is a bar on North Avenue in one of the entertainment districts. And in that record, you will find a letter from Judge D'Amato (sic) that I think directly impeaches the statement that was made on his behalf through this transcript today.

You will find letters from neighbors to that location that are complaining, neighbors complaining of public urination, noise, people arguing, people fighting when they leave the location. And you will also find that that location has been renewed despite those objections every year.

If you want, I'll attempt to direct you more specifically where that is.

THE COURT: No, I'll find it.

MR. ARENA: In regards to the findings of fact, I just want to be brief on this, the conclusions of law. Those are signed by Alderman Pawlinski and they're debated in committee by members of the committee, and not each one is specifically looked at and determined to be whether or not it's been found to be true or not. I think a general recitation of the affidavits is basically done and submitted as the findings and the conclusions.

1 We did object to those findings and conclusions 2 in writing. And I will note at the Common Council 3 hearing, the neighbors appeared without doing a written objection, which is also required by Chapter 125 and 4 5 the procedure, I think it's 125 -- 2(b), yet another violation of my client's due process rights. 6 7 My client had no idea or very little idea if there was going to be an objection, and he has the right 8 to have those objections done in writing prior to that 9 10 Common Council hearing. 11 Mr. Plain, who testified here today, was 12 allowed to, I guess, just show up and make a statement, 13 which is contrary to any rights that I've ever been 14 provided at the Council. The procedure and the procedures in 125, you have to do written objections 15 16 to findings of fact. Now --17 THE COURT: Where is that reference? 18 MR. SCHRIMPF: Your Honor --19 MR. BISHOP: It's actually in 90, your Honor, 20 90-12-b. 21 Counsel is -- I think if you MR. SCHRIMPF: 22 check the ordinances and the statutes, you'll find 23 that it is up to the discretion of the chairman of the 24 committee if someone has not filed written objections, if 25 they may also speak.

The statute allows the filing of written

objections; that's 125.

The ordinance allows the council member or the

chairman of the council to determine if someone can also

speak within their sound discretion. And I can tell you that in every instance that I am personally familiar

with, the chairman of the council or the president of the Milwaukee Common Council, when an interested party

9 appears, has allowed them to speak.

MR. BISHOP: I'm sorry, your Honor. That's c-2, c-3, and also into "d" concerning written objections.

MR. SCHRIMPF: And Mr. Leonard advises me 90-12 specifically allows the complainant, and Mr. Plain was a complainant, I think it was -- carefully made that record -- to speak before the council, whether or not they have filed objections.

MR. ARENA: Well, I believe that Chapter 125 requires it, and I believe that as the city is the drafters of Chapter 90, that Chapter 125 actually should control in this instance.

MR. SCHRIMPF: Your Honor, section 125.10(1) allows the council to control the liquor licensing process if they do it by ordinance. And so long as what they do is not inconsistent with Chapter 125, 125.10(1)

by ordinance allows the council to do what they did in section 90-12.

THE COURT: 125.12(2)(b)3 provides that either the complainant or the licensee may file an objection to the report and shall have the opportunity to present arguments supporting the objection to the city council. The city council shall determine whether the arguments should be presented orally, in writing, or both. I don't see anything in there that's mandatory.

MR. BISHOP: In 90-12, c-2, it requires written objections to be filed by the licensee. If you're saying that the licensee has to file written objections, if there is no -- there would be no requirement for the other party to file written objections, that would be a violation. There is no notice of someone showing up at the hearing to object to the findings of fact if you were not even objecting to the findings of fact.

There is no notice for the opportunity for someone to make a speech for the five minutes that the Common Council allows based upon filing written objections. They draft their own ordinances, the City of Milwaukee does. The argument that we're making here is they're simply not following it. And the only argument that they've said is that, traditionally, we've done this. They drafted these ordinances.

THE COURT: Subsection "d" says: Oral argument 2 3 in support of the report and recommendation presented by the city attorney, oral argument on behalf of the 4 5 licensee in opposition to the report and recommendation, 6 and oral argument by the complainant objecting to the report and recommendation shall be permitted only at 7 8 the discretion of the chair. 9 In other words, the ordinance says the chair can exercise discretion and do what the chair would like. 10 11 MR. BISHOP: But it does require us to file written objections and --12 13 THE COURT: And if you don't, the chair can exercise discretion, allow you to make oral argument. 14 15 MR. BISHOP: But there is still a notice requirement, and I guess that would be the issue in 16 If the -- if there is no written 17 particular. documentation filed objecting to the conclusions of the 18 U&L, how is a licensee to know that someone is going to 19 appear at council and speak for five minutes against the 20 21 situation. 22 THE COURT: He's not going to know because they showed up at the Utilities Commission and said, we oppose 23 24 this and this is what we want? 25 MR. BISHOP: Correct, that --

In addition --

1

1 I mean, that doesn't -- what's the THE COURT: 2 form of the notice -- "We object." 3. MR. BISHOP: No, the notice comes from actually 4 Mr. Leonard. He can testify to what the notice said. 5 THE COURT: No, no. You tell me in the 6 ordinance, what does the ordinance have to say. 7 merely says there has to be a written objection. object; I want a revocation. What more? What's the 8 9 undue surprise to your client that a bunch of citizens are going to show up and talk for five minutes, basically 10 saying what they said at the Utilities Commission? 11 MR. BISHOP: Because if there are no written 12 objections filed, how is a licensee to know if he doesn't 13 14 dispute the recommendation of the U&L to show up to argue against them trying to overturn the committee's report. 15 16 THE COURT: What in the ordinance requires the 17 full council to accept the recommendation of the committee and not reject it on its own motion. 18 19 MR. BISHOP: Nothing; there is nothing in that insofar as this particular ordinance, you are correct. 20 21 What I'm saying, though, is that the ordinance 22 does say that the licensee has to file written 23 objections. Now it does also say later on that it's at the discretion of the Common Council President, 24 25 essentially, as to whether or not, or how oral argument

- is going to be heard. All I'm saying is that there is a notice issue there.
- I -- I agree with you that you have nothing in there that specifically says that a complainant has to file a written objection.
- 6 THE COURT: All right. All right.
- 7 MR. SCHRIMPF: Your Honor, just very briefly,
  8 first of all, I'd like to point out that if one checks
  9 the transcripts, you'll see that Miss Hawks took no
  10 position with respect to what should happen with this
  11 license. And so far as Miss Hawks is concerned, counsel
  12 read you a cutting from Page 17 of the transcript.
- THE COURT: Oh, I'm going to read the entire transcript.
- 15 MR. SCHRIMPF: All right. I would strongly
  16 recommend the remainder of that page and the top of
  17 Page 18 because several specific questions were asked
  18 about her involvement, and she indicated basically that
  19 she had no involvement.
- 20 And then, finally -- I guess that's it. That's 21 what I have.
- THE COURT: Mr. Arena, you get last kick at the cat.
- MR. ARENA: I'll rely on my brief, Judge. I think we made our points and it's clear.

1	THE COURT: All right. I'll put this over
. 2	until 2:30 this afternoon and render a decision at that
3	point.
4	MR. SCHRIMPF: Thank you very much.
5	MR. ARENA: I do have an appearance at 1:30,
6	which it's in misdemeanor court. I'm sure I can be here
7	at 2:30, but I may be late or whatever, just to let you
8	know. I'll be in Judge Kahn's Court.
9	THE COURT: Prefer 3:00 o'clock? Is that
10	safer?
11	MR. ARENA: 3:00 o'clock probably as Judge
12	Kahn, he tends to take give due diligence to
13	sentencing argument, to sentencing clients people.
14	THE COURT: All right.
15	MR. SCHRIMPF: Is it 3:00 o'clock then, your
16	Honor?
17	THE COURT: Adjourn to 3:00 o'clock.
18	MR. SCHRIMPF: Thank you very much.
1,9	(WHEREUPON, the noon recess was had.)
20	THE COURT: We'll recall Mr. Entertainment,
21	Inc., et al, versus City of Milwaukee; Case No.
22	01CV010580. Why don't you restate appearances for the
23	record.
24	MR. ARENA: Michael DeSautel, registered agent
25	of Mr. Entertainment, Inc. appears in person and by

1 counsel, Andrew Arena, of Kopp, Arena and Bishop.

MR. SCHRIMPF: City of Milwaukee appears by Grant F. Langley, Milwaukee City Attorney, and Bruce D. Schrimpf, Assistant City Attorney, Bruce D. Schrimpf in court.

THE COURT: All right, the Court has reviewed the memoranda that have been submitted and the transcripts, which make for delightful reading over the lunch hour, and is prepared to render a decision. There are several issues that are to be addressed.

And the standard to be applied and the issue regarding the issuance of a temporary injunction under 813.02 requires that the plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits and irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted during the course of the hearing.

The first question is whether or not the Court has authority to issue an injunction. I don't think that's seriously being disputed in this case. It's not a situation in which -- even the distinct situation where this might be an application for a new license or even nonrenewal. This is a license that's being revoked during the period of the license itself, and certainly there is a property interest in the license. And if -- under both constitutional and common law guidelines,

standards, the Court would have authority to issue a temporary injunction.

3.

The first challenge that's raised by the plaintiff is that the city violated the plaintiff's due process rights in failing to follow its own ordinance in Chapter 90-12-b-3 of the city ordinances, which require the city attorney to prosecute complaints before the Utilities and Licensing Committee.

The Court, in reading that ordinance, concludes that the ordinance does not, in fact, require the city attorney to actually present evidence and represent the complainants.

If the city attorney is choosing to represent and prosecute, it sets forth a standard in which the city would go forward presenting its evidence and having the burden of proof. However, in many circumstances and, historically, the city has chosen not to prosecute those complaints and leaves the complainants to present their own case.

So the Court finds that there -- the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof to establish the city violated the plaintiff's due process rights in that manner.

Secondly, to an extent, I guess not under the constitutional claims, the plaintiff argues that issue

preclusion should result from Judge Moroney's decision in the action in which the city commenced a proceeding seeking to have the Daddios bar declared a public nuisance, and the matter came on for hearing before Judge Moroney on a hearing for temporary restraining order.

The transcript reflects that Judge Moroney concluded that the case was not a proper circumstance for a temporary restraining order, that the matter should both be addressed administratively through the ordinances, but under the circumstances, would not rise to the level of warranting a temporary restraining order to shut down the business while the action was proceeding. Ultimately, that action was dismissed. There was no final determination, no final conclusions by Judge Moroney. Therefore, issue preclusion would not arise from that particular case.

The next avenue that the plaintiff raises is the argument of the -- whether or not the hearing before the Utilities and Licensing Commission was a fair and impartial hearing, making two arguments:

The first argument -- that Alderman Pawlinski should have recused himself because he had prejudged the circumstance and yet was a -- not only a member of the committee, but chairman of that committee;

Secondly, that Mr. Schrimpf played a dual role

on behalf of the city during that hearing in both
prosecuting and advising the board, the committee at the
time that it was rendering its decision.

23.

The Court is going to conclude that the plaintiff did not -- there was strong evidence and plaintiff has met its burden at this injunction hearing to demonstrate strong likelihood of prevailing that the hearing was not a fair and impartial hearing.

The circumstances that give rise to that conclusion are -- begin with the standards that are set forth in Marris v. the City of Cedarburg. And in that particular case, the court explained that a fair and impartial hearing under common law concepts of due process and fair play include the right to have matters decided by an impartial board. The due process violation occurs when there is bias or unfairness, in fact, or when the risk of bias is impermissibly high.

And in determining whether a person is afforded due process and fair play, the court in that case recognized that zoning decisions, similar to licensing decisions, implicate important private and public interests that significantly affect individual property ownership rights as well as community interests in the use and enjoyment of land.

It also noted that zoning decisions and,

similarly, licensing decisions, are especially vulnerable to problems of bias and conflicts of interests because of the localized nature of the decisions, the fact that members of the boards are drawn from the immediate geographical area, and the adjudicative, legislative and political nature of the zoning or licensing process. And since biases may distort judgment, impartial decision—makers are needed to ensure both sound fact—finding and rational decision—making as well as to ensure public confidence in the decision—making process.

The court went on to explain, however, nevertheless, a board member's opinions on land use and preferences regarding land development -- here, for general opinions on licensing or general opinions regarding taverns -- that those general opinions should not necessarily disqualify the member from hearing that matter. Since they are purposefully selected from the local area and reflect community values and preferences regarding, in that case, land use and, here, licensing, the members will be familiar with local conditions and the people of the community and can be expected to have opinions about local licensing or zoning issues.

The question then is whether or not, and as indicated in the <u>Marris</u> case, a clear statement suggesting that a decision has already been reached or

prejudged should suffice to invalidate a decision. And we have to examine the specific facts in this case.

The starting fact is that Mr. Pawlinski,
Alderman Pawlinski's legislative aide made an opening
statement in front of the committee. It wasn't a mere
summary of contacts with Alderman Pawlinski's office. It
wasn't a mere presentation of documents that had been in
the files of Mr. -- Alderman Pawlinski's office, but it
was really an impassioned plea in support of revocation.

For example, beginning on Page 10, she thanks the committee members for convening to hear the revocation that the neighbors have brought forward, that she could assure the committee members that the neighbors are prepared to give direct and germane testimony.

She goes on to state that throughout the hearing, you will be presented with evidence of how the neighbors have been forced to compromise their quality of life. Today you will hear the neighbors' detailed accounts of vandalism, loud music, other conduct that she identifies.

She goes on to say that they as well as Alderman Pawlinski's office have kept accurate and complete records of these incidents, highlighting Alderman Pawlinski's very direct involvement in this case.

She handed out a general complaint sheet.

She described that over the last three years, Alderman

Pawlinski has called six face-to-face meetings with the

plaintiff to specifically counsel him on the serious

neighborhood issues; that the plaintiff had numerous

chances to improve his business and eliminate this

intolerable behavior.

She states that you will also hear from very patient neighbors who have also given the plaintiff endless chances to correct illicit behavior. She goes on and again describes the neighbors as patient, that they could have requested nonrenewal of the license, and argues that they were giving him ample opportunity to make changes.

She describes and states that the plaintiff makes many promises, but never fulfills them, and that the problems have gotten worse. She describes that they have gone beyond quality of life nuisance complaints, and that the neighbors fear for their safety and well-being of their families.

She anticipates a defense by the plaintiff, who may argue that unruly patrons come from other bars, and argues that that's not the case and points out information or evidence that will refute that. She states that Alderman Pawlinski's office has documented

just three complaints in total over the past five years from those other establishments.

7.

She goes on to note that, again, highlighting that there have been six face-to-face meetings with the plaintiff, five written warning letters, and over three dozen phone calls. She notes 104 complaints in the form of e-mails, phone calls, et cetera.

Mr. Schrimpf interjects at that point and asks that she repeat how many face-to-face meetings there were, letters, et cetera, and she reemphasizes those.

She goes on to state that the neighbors have been extraordinarily patient. They supported him in his first effort to obtain his liquor license in 1996, and that he made promises and those promises went unfulfilled, but this time it's different.

She ends by arguing the neighbors deserve peace, and the time has come for action. The neighbors' deserve -- the neighbors' desire for revocation is strong, unified, and uncompromising.

She's making a very clear opening statement, arguing in favor of revocation as a representative of Alderman Pawlinski's office.

She then goes on to say, "At this time I will call our first witness." It is as if she were making the opening statement of a case being argued to this Court.

1	So she was a strong advocate, and she was an advocate and
2	an arm of Alderman Pawlinski.
3	Later at Page 47 of the first transcript, after
4	Mr. Plain has testified, Miss Hawks interjects and says:
5	Mr. Chairman, I'd like to clarify something.
6	And Mr. Pawlinski, Alderman Pawlinski said:
7	Go ahead.
8	Mr. Arena objected. Mr. Schrimpf interjected
9	and said the objection was well taken, at which point
10	Chairman Pawlinski states:
11	That's fine. Sarah, hold off on that.
12	And then on Page 84, Miss Hawks was asked by
13	Mr. Schrimpf:
14	Miss Hawks, earlier you wanted recognition.
15	Do you still want to say something?
16	Miss Hawks answers: Yes.
17	There was an objection, and Chairman Pawlinski
18	then says:
19	Then I'll ask a question. How's that,
20	Mr. Arena?
21	And Mr. Arena said: Fine. You have a right
22	to do that.
23	And on Page 85, after asking some questions,
24	Chairman Pawlinski goes on to say:
25	Well, I can tell you I've driven up and down

that street thousands of times, and it's my testimony
here that it is, in fact, the Howell Avenue side of the
building.

Mr. Schrimpf interjects: Mr. Chairman, you are not in the position of testifying.

Chairman Pawlinski responds: I'm telling you that I've driven that street thousands of times.

Mr. Plain, this is your picture. Why don't you tell us.

Reading through the remaining parts of the transcript, Alderman Pawlinski asks some questions during the course of the hearing. They aren't necessarily pointed questions while the complainants are presenting their testimony. However, when the plaintiff calls witnesses, Mr. -- rather, Alderman Pawlinski becomes very active in asking questions.

And then, ultimately, at the time of the vote, he steps down as chair of the meeting and makes comments. He states: I could never support a 20-day suspension in this situation. I think revocation is warranted, strongly.

He states: I think this case is tight. And in reading that, it gives the impression it was his case, that his legislative aide was presenting the case, and it is his position the case is tight and it's sound and irrefutable.

He goes on on Page 267:

I don't know what more a person can do in my situation or in the situation of the neighbors. I don't know how many more meetings I have to have. I don't know how many more phone calls we have to place. I don't know how much more documentation individuals in the neighborhood need to provide to this body. I've had six meetings with the plaintiff in the last three years. I've had — I've written him five letters. We have placed three dozen phone calls, and we have logged 104 separate complaints. Even if there was no incident of police — of a police nature that took place on the 30th of September, this still would warrant a revocation, in my opinion.

He goes on to say that he wrote to the plaintiff and stated: "Michael, my frustration level is at its peak. I cannot have this kind of activity continue any longer. . . ." He states, "I have no tolerance for even one more neighborhood complaint in the year 2001. . . ."

Unfortunately, those statements and the active role of his legislative assistant, I think, strongly indicate and rise to the level that the plaintiff has to meet, that the strong likelihood is that the plaintiff will prevail in ultimately obtaining a ruling that there

was not a fair hearing.

I think under those circumstances, Alderman Pawlinski and, understandably, he's the alderman for this district -- he has constituents who have complained strongly to him. He has engaged in a several year attempts to resolve complaints with this particular individual, problems that have been described by his constituents, through his attempts to resolve them and, as he described it, his frustration was at a peak. It was time to act and he favored revocation. But I think he favored revocation before the hearing began.

Under those circumstances, he should have recused himself. And in the language of Marris, that fact warrants the invalidation of the decision of the committee. It should be clear at this point, and the language of that case is if the evidence suggests that a decision has already been reached or prejudged, that should suffice to invalidate the decision.

I'm not getting to the merits of this decision under any circumstance whatsoever. What the committee decided, it may ultimately decide again in the end. What I'm concluding is that the hearing itself was not fair and impartial under the circumstances of this case.

I'm also concerned of the role Mr. Schrimpf played during the course of the hearing. The fact that

he represented the city in the independent action before Judge Moroney is a different proceeding, and I'm not prepared to rule that that automatically prevents him from representing the board.

However, during the course of the hearing,
Mr. Schrimpf as the city attorney and advisor to the
board played more than a passive role of advising
the board. In numerous circumstances, he questioned
witnesses. There is a statement at Page 8 that he
assisted the neighbors in framing their complaint, which
certainly, although not prosecuting or representing them,
did assist them in preparing the complaints for the
committee.

At various times he played the role of a neutral advisor to the board, making sure that exhibits were individually marked, that there was a proper foundation for exhibits being admitted, for example, pictures, asking questions of who took the pictures, are they accurate -- just to make sure they should fit the record, which may be appropriate and is appropriate for an advisor to the board, and at times clarified some factual disputes. For example, when Miss Hawks said that the plaintiff's live music license was revoked, he indicated that, factually, it was nonrenewed, which is a significant question.

However, for example, on Page 53 through 59, six pages of the transcript, Mr. Schrimpf is asking questions of Mr. Plain. He was clarifying dates and times to explain when certain incidents occurred. He asked him to explain how he knew that the plaintiff had security. He was asking him was he asleep at the time the incident occurred or was he awakened by the conduct, certainly significant in whether — the nature of the disturbance. He questioned him about what the security did. He questioned and brought out information about whether patrons regularly or frequently set off car alarms through certain activity. He brought out other incidents of disturbances from Mr. Plain.

That wasn't done at the request of a board member asking -- who might be struggling to get information. It was Mr. Schrimpf asking the Chairman to be able to ask questions to solicit information.

On Page 76, he was asking questions about activities of the security personnel leaving cigarette butts on Mr. Plain's lawn, again, clarifying whether testimony -- certain incidents occurred in the early morning hours or evening hours, and questioned and brought out information about an individual who was wrapping a T-shirt around his arm and clarifying that he saw blood coming from him.

And, again, I would point out he did play the role of a neutral in a variety of circumstances, advising Alderman Pawlinski that at one time when he was bringing out information on Page 126 about underage drinking, Mr. Schrimpf quickly stepped in and said, that's not in the complaint. You can't consider it.

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In another circumstance, Page 160, there were questions coming forth from aldermen as to why didn't the neighbors complain at the time of the renewal of the license in May of 2001, and Mr. Schrimpf brought out the questions about -- to one of the witnesses about whether or not he knew when the license was being renewed.

And on Page 26 of the second transcript, Exhibit 10A, brought out questions about whether that specific individual had any problems with any of the other bars in the area.

So in reviewing the transcript, I find Mr. Schrimpf was -- had a blended role of assisting the prosecution of the case as well as impartially advising the board. And certainly in an administrative hearing, one attorney cannot represent both the neutral board and the prosecution.

So I think under that circumstance, the plaintiff has met its burden to prove a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits that the hearing was not fair

1 and impartial.

23.

On the issue of a violation, due process violation because there was -- the revocation did not involve progressive discipline, I've read the three cases that were cited. Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, there is no discipline involved in that case whatsoever. It involved the situation of minors in a single establishment under a local ordinance that prohibited minors from playing video games, and there was no prosecution or no citations issued. There was a finding of a violation of due process, however, under the circumstances as a discriminatory enforcement, but there was no issue of progressive discipline.

In Tavern League v. City of Madison, there was an ordinance that allowed withholding of a license if there were outstanding tax liens. There is no issue regarding progressive discipline at all.

And in Menomonee Falls v. Michelson, it dealt with an ordinance requiring disconnecting any drain that discharged into the sewer. Again, it had nothing to do with progressive discipline. And so there -- the Court finds there is no case law to support the requirement under the due process clause that there be progressive discipline and that the plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof in that area.

As to the discriminatory enforcement allegation, the Court finds the plaintiff has failed to prove, or meet its burden that it would likely succeed on the merits of a discriminatory enforcement. In Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, which was cited, it notes that in order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove the defendant, acting under color of state authority, deprived the plaintiff of rights, and they alleged intentional discriminatory enforcement.

The court noted that in order to prevail, the plaintiff must further prove that the ordinance was enforced with an evil eye and an unequal hand. There must be a showing of an intentional and systematic discrimination.

Also, in the <u>Village of Menomonee Falls v.</u>
Michelson, that court stated that:

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated if an ordinance is administered "with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to the rights." Nevertheless, evidence that a municipality has enforced an ordinance in one instance and not in others would not in itself establish a violation of the equal protection clause. There must be a showing of an

intentional, systematic and arbitrary discrimination.

Here, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the city has discriminated in the enforcement of the ordinance. There are several examples of other taverns, bars whose licenses have not been revoked under facts, some of which are similar to the facts that were presented to the committee in this case. However, the totality of the circumstances of each case has to be considered. The period of time and how many licenses the city has and has issued, how many suspensions, how many revocations, none of that is indicated.

Rather, the discussion of the committee and the Council regarding revocations have discussed the fact that there are ongoing situations of licenses being revoked, suspensions imposed, licenses not being renewed, and that the city takes those situations seriously and attempts to address them in a nondiscriminatory manner. And the mere fact that there are other situations that have some similar facts does not rise to the level of discrimination.

Lastly, the question of whether or not there is irreparable harm. I am convinced by the language in Bruno v. City of Kenosha, 333 F. Supp. 726, although it was reversed on other grounds, that of jurisdiction, there the district court explained that plaintiffs are

tavernkeepers. Their livelihood and their investments are hinged upon their ability to sell liquor, and this ability in turn depends upon processing — possessing a liquor license. And were I to fail to continue the outstanding temporary restraining orders, plaintiffs would be left without means to earn their living. Nor are these actions of such a nature that if the temporary restraining orders were not continued and plaintiffs are ultimately successful in the main action that they might then be able to calculate the damage done and sue for monetary relief.

So I think under the circumstances as the record has been presented, the Court does find, as I've indicated, that the plaintiff has proven a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, that the action — the hearing held before the Utilities and Licensing Commission was — did not constitute a fair and impartial hearing, thereby violating the due process rights of the plaintiff in the manner as I described, and that the plaintiff has also proven irreparable harm;

That for those reasons, the Court is going to grant the motion for a temporary injunction enjoining the city from revoking the license, liquor license or licenses held by the plaintiff. That will continue until a hearing in this case, which I'm open to suggestion on

2 MR. SCHRIMPF: Your Honor, I have a couple of 3 questions. 4 THE COURT: Okav. 5 Thank you. First of all, in MR. SCHRIMPF: light of the Court's decision, it seems to me that an 6 7 appropriate order would be an order of remand to the 8 Common Council for purposes of correcting these deficiencies. In connection with that, I have a couple 9 10 of questions that flow from that. 11 First of all, with respect to the involvement of Alderman Pawlinski at the committee level, I hope --12 I hope everyone bears in mind that that resulted in a 13 14 recommendation for a 20-day suspension. 15 THE COURT: I do. MR. SCHRIMPF: 16 It wasn't until it got to the Common Council that we got a revocation. And as a result 17 of that, I am wondering if the Court has any directions 18 on Alderman Pawlinski's further involvement, when and if 19 it comes back to the Common Council and for that matter, 20 I suppose, my own involvement on those -- on those 21 22 issues. That's point number one. 23 And point number two is that is the Court now 24 vacating the judgment of the Common Council?

how you want to proceed with that.

1

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THE COURT: At this point, I have continued the

1 injunction. 2 MR. SCHRIMPF: Okay. 3 THE COURT: The avenues -- the likelihood of the city introducing additional evidence is not 5 necessarily pretty strong in this case, and we have a record that we're going to have, and it's likely the plaintiff is going to prevail under the circumstance. 7 A quick resolution under the circumstance would 8 be to vacate the revocation by the Council, remand the 9 matter to the Utilities Commission to hold an appropriate 10 11 hearing before a fair and impartial committee. 12 MR. SCHRIMPF: Your Honor, on that point, my 1.3 only point is this. I don't think because of the posture 14 of this case, you can remand it back to the Utilities and 15 Licenses Committee. I think you can remand it back to the Milwaukee Common Council. The Milwaukee Common 16 Council can, in turn, either take the case on its own or 17 18 remand it back to U&L with the directions as to who might 19 serve on that committee. THE COURT: So you'd be satisfied -- asking 20 both of you -- if I granted a judgment vacating the 21 22 revocation and remanding it to the Common Council? 23 MR. SCHRIMPF: That's right. 24 THE COURT: With directions to proceed with an

appropriate hearing.

1	MR. SCHRIMPF: That's correct.
2	MR. ARENA: If I could be heard on that?
3	THE COURT: Sure.
4	MR. ARENA: I think Marris would require that
5	you remand it back to the Utilities and Licenses
6	Committee. Under the rules that were promulgated by the
	Council and the President of the Council, they determine
8	who the U&L committee is.
9	I also believe that Alderman Pawlinski would
10	have to be recused from the committee and recused from
11	the Council in that he's the one that made the motion for
12	a suspension despite the recommendation for a 20-day
13	suspension.
14	THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to rule one way
15	or another whether or not he has to recuse himself.
1.6	Certainly my ruling says he can't be on the Utilities
17	Commission.
18	MR. SCHRIMPF: For purposes of this case.
19	THE COURT: For the purposes of this case.
20	MR. SCHRIMPF: Correct.
21	MR. ARENA: No, kick him off for good
22	I mean, nobody is arguing that.
23	THE COURT: Oh, I'm not sure what the role of
24	any alderman would be and whether or not an alderman who,
25	or in any municipality, who takes a position regarding

the revocation of a license once it gets to the legislative body, could or couldn't vote.

1.4

I mean, certainly watered down at the level that it's at, I don't know and I'm not ready to rule on whether or not, and I don't have to rule on whether or not at the Common Council level, what an alderman -- what position the alderman has to take.

MR. SCHRIMPF: Your Honor, in -- in that connection, and I don't know where this is ultimately going to go, but in that connection, I would recommend or urge the Court to consider a case called Boroo,

B-o-r-o-o, v. Town Board of Barnes cited at 10 Wis. 2d

153. The part that I'm interested in is at Page 162;

102 N.W. 2d 238, the part I am interested in is at 242 and 243, as well as a well-known treatise on the subject,

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations. I have a cite in the case to McQuillin, and I'm sure it's been updated since then, Page 660, section 10.35, basically speaking, that the mere fact that one of the board members or one of the members of the council may be animated by animus towards an applicant does not render the entire decision unlawful.

THE COURT: Well, that gets back to what happens at the Common Council level. At this point, I'm finding that the committee hearing is invalidated

1 and void. 2 MR. SCHRIMPF: Sure. 3 THE COURT: And so I'm not sure the distinction 4 between remanding it back -- my remanding it to the 5 committee versus remanding it to the Common Council and if it makes a significant effect one way or another. 6 7 MR. SCHRIMPF: Oh, I think it does because what you have right here is a decision of the Milwaukee Common . 9 Council which, under Chapter 125, was appealed to the 10 circuit court. And if you check 125.12(2)(d) 11 specifically, it points out that it is the decision of the governing body which is appealed to circuit court. 12 13 Therefore circuit court, it seems to me, remands it back 14 to the governing body. The governing body has to figure out what to do with it from that point. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Arena? If they try and go 16 17 ahead and do something without sending it back to the 18 committee, that's another legal issue that you have and 19 I can't address with them, but I don't think they --20 MR. ARENA: To me, it's almost like a criminal 21 case where there is a mistrial. You got to start all 22 over. So it's got to go back, it's got to be remanded 23 back to the committee. MR. SCHRIMPF: Well, then I would suggest that 24

the Court remand it back to the Council with directions

- that it be remanded to the Utilities and Licenses
  Committee for a new hearing.
- THE COURT: Okay, that's -- my reaction as to

  Mr. Arena's response was, well, really what it is, is

  the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court on a

  certiorari review of a parole or probation revocation

  and with the direction to send it back to probation and

  parole.
- 9 MR. SCHRIMPF: Right.

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- THE COURT: All right, then what I'm going to
  do is I'll grant judgment vacating the revocation by the
  city, remand the matter to the Common Council to -- with
  direction to remand the matter to the Utilities and
  Licensing Commission for further proceedings.
  - I think it should also be understood that this case is over and done with. I'm not remanding it with directions to come to some conclusion and bring it back before this case -- this Court. It is a remand, and the jurisdiction of this Court now ceases.
- MR. SCHRIMPF: Thank you. Shall I draft the order, your Honor?
- 22 THE COURT: You want to fight about it or you 23 want to delegate that. Mr. Arena, you prevailed; you 24 could have the option, but Mr. Schrimpf is volunteering.
- MR. ARENA: I think that I prefer to draft it.

1 THE COURT: All right. 2 MR. ARENA: Or give it a shot. 3 MR. SCHRIMPF: Under the five-day rule. THE COURT: Under the five-day rule, and let me 5 suggest that all I want to see in that order is that it 6 came on for hearing today; I heard testimony, argument, 7 and for the reasons stated on the record, and then indicate what my ruling is. 9 MR. ARENA: Okay. 10 MR. SCHRIMPF: And that is remand to the Common Council with directions to remand to the Utilities and 11 12 Licenses Committee for a new hearing. THE COURT: Right, and that's all it should 13 You don't have to make the -- the findings and 14 15 conclusions about the constitutional issues are stated on the record. They don't have to be put in the written 16 order. 17 MR. ARENA: 18 Okay. THE COURT: So -- and note that -- I guess I 19 would add, ask you to add that the jurisdiction of this 20 Court ceases because we've had some circumstances where 21 I've remanded to administrative bodies with a question of 22 23 whether or not I was looking for it to come back to me for further review. 24

In this case, I'm not looking for further

1	review. And if there is a dissatisfactory result by
2	either party, they have to start a new action, rather
3	than merely bring this one back.
4	MR. SCHRIMPF: I think I know the case to which
5	the Court refers.
6	THE COURT: It's only one, only one.
7	All right, thank you very much. Good luck.
8	You want the exhibit to remain or can it be
9	withdrawn, the video? Is somebody appealing this
10	decision?
11	MR. SCHRIMPF: I don't think so.
12	THE COURT: Thinking about it?
13	MR. ARENA: I don't think we are.
14	THE COURT: All right.
15	MR. SCHRIMPF: I don't think the city will.
16	THE COURT: If there is no objection, we'll
17	return Exhibit 1 to the city to retain it during any
18	period of appeal.
19	(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 1 was returned to
20	counsel for the city.)
21	MR. SCHRIMPF: Sure. Thank you very much.
22	(WHEREUPON, the foregoing proceedings were
23	concluded.)
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3	
4	State of Wisconsin ) ( SS:
5	County of Milwaukee )
6	
7	
8	I, Linda A. Hughes, do hereby certify that I am
9	the Official Reporter for the Circuit Court, Branch 10,
10	in and for the County of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and that
11	the above and foregoing is a true, correct, and complete
12	transcript of the proceedings had on the dates indicated
13	herein, as contained in my stenographic notes.
14	Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 19th day of
15	November, 2001.
16	
17	
18	Janda a. Frighes
19	Official Reporter, Br. 10
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	