## Follow-Up Materials from the Sept. 19th JAC Discussion

 October $9^{\text {th }}, 2018$


# Wyoming Retirement System 

Partnering to Build Financial Security for Members and their Families

Matt Mead<br>Governor

Ruth Ryerson
Executive Director

October $9^{\text {th }}, 2018$

To: Senator Bruce Burns, Co-Chairman
Representative Bob Nicholas, Co-Chairman
CC: Members of the JAC
RE: Follow up materials from Sept. 19th JAC meeting

VIA EMAIL
C/O Legislative Service Office

## Dear Committee Members:

The WRS Board appreciates the interest of the JAC in exploring a performance compensation program to assist us in attracting and retaining the best and brightest to WRS. We thank you for your continued interest, and look forward to answering any additional questions you may have in the upcoming meeting.

This memo provides WRS' responses to questions and data requested during the JAC meeting on September $19^{\text {th }}$.

Sincerely,


Laura Led,
Board Chair



Ruth Ryerson,
Executive Director

## /s/

Tom Chapman, Investment Committee Chair


Sam Masoudi, Chief Investment Officer

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During the September 19th JAC meeting, Chairman Nicholas asked WRS and STO to provide responses to the following:

1. Provide a comparison of current salaries paid to investment staff, especially junior analysts, against the McLagan survey. Include both the $75 \%$ public pension comparator and $25 \%$ regional private sector comparator as well as the composite of the two with a comparison against your respective salaries for analyst, officer, senior analyst and CIO.

See Exhibit A for the relevant pages from the McLagan data included in the May 24th, 2018 report to Alaska. See Exhibit B for McLagan full universe data provided to WRS.

| Salary (\$ in 000 s ) | Legal | Analyst/Sr <br> Analyst | Investment Officer | SIO | CIO |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public Median - All Combined | \$187 | \$91 | \$171 | \$222 | \$332 |
| Median-Primarily External | \$181 | \$88 | \$165 | \$232 | \$319 |
| Median- Primarily Internal | \$256 | \$95 | \$178 | \$200 | \$387 |
| Private (using Alaska McLagan Study) | NA | \$70 | \$188 | \$301 | \$420 |
| 75\% Public Median/25\% Private Median ${ }^{1}$ | NA | \$86 | \$175 | \$242 | \$354 |
| WRS Actual | \$123 | \$70 | N/A | \$187 | \$232 |
| STO Actual |  | \$70 | N/A | \$152 | \$250 |

2. Offer any comments on the constitutionality of performance pay. Attached is LSO's opinion on this question.

WRS does not have anything to add to the state's opinion on the matter.
3. Provide a statistical analysis of other states' performance, net of fees, for those pension funds with internal investments or external investment management, and those with performance pay against those without performance pay.

It is not possible to isolate the impact of any one minor variable, such as internal investing or incentive compensation plans, on returns because there are so many other contributing interacting variables. As a

[^0]result, all efforts to find a correlation with fund return for either of the variables requested were inconclusive.

## Internal Investing

Unequivocally, the overwhelming majority of investment returns is driven by the interaction and combination of two variables: asset allocation and manager selection, which are typically within the purview of the investment team. As a result, superior investment returns are mostly dependent on having a stable, experienced, talented investment team. While it is not possible to isolate the impact of having a team with these characteristics, it is reasonable to assume that the opposite of all of these characteristics would certainly not be desirable.

Asset allocation is the primary factor driving investment returns. Several academic studies have suggested that the impact could be as high as $85-95 \%$. By definition, this would mean that internal investing could only impact a portion of the remaining 5-15\%.

WRS was not able to determine the exact composition, performance, or the dollar value of the assets invested internally for many of the pensions. Among the plans that invest internally, performance correlations were statistically inconclusive over all time periods. The highest correlation was with the three-year period, which had a very low correlation of less than 0.09--meaning it explains less than $10 \%$ of the return variance. Over the last 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods, roughly an equal number of these plans outperformed and underperformed their peer funds' median returns, suggesting randomness of this variable. We have included the relevant responses to previous subcommittee inquiries showing both the return relationship as it relates to size, internal and CIO tenure within the entire universe of 72 pension plans (Appendix C) and for the smaller subset of pensions under $\$ 20 \mathrm{~B}$ with internal management (Appendix D).

## Incentive Compensation

A stable, experienced investment team is undoubtedly critical to producing superior investment returns. Providing competitive compensation is critical to building this type of team.

After reviewing annual reports, board minutes, and plan websites for the list of 72 pensions, we were not able to determine if there was a correlation between producing superior returns and having incentive compensation plans in place. This was due in part to not being able to determine whether these pensions have had incentive compensation plans in place, and if so, the plans' materiality, and when they became effective, rendering any analysis incomplete or potentially misleading. However, according to the McLagan report prepared for Alaska Permanent, as of May 2018, 75\% of pensions used in their report and almost all private sector peers have incentive compensation programs, indicating they are becoming the market standard.

Appendix A - Private Pay Data from Alaska Study performed by McLagan


## Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation Compensation Program Review

May 24, 2018

| Survey Match | Competitive Market (Private Sector Firms) |  |  |  |  |  | Quartile <br> Positioning |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Salary |  |  | Total Cash |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 25th |  | 75th |  |  |
|  | Percentile | Median | Percentile | Percentile | Median | Percentile | Salary | T. Cash |
| Management |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CIO | \$356 | \$420 | \$567 | \$725 | \$1,055 | \$1,873 | 3 | 4 |
| ED without CIO Resp | 400 | 455 | 654 | 922 | 1,399 | 3,014 | 4 | 4 |
| CLO | 263 | 325 | 371 | 412 | 676 | 833 | 4 | 4 |
| CFO | 230 | 296 | 353 | 371 | 565 | 902 | 4 | 4 |
|  | \$1,248 | \$1,496 | \$1,944 | \$2,429 | \$3,694 | \$6,622 | 4 | 4 |
|  | -10\% | -25\% | -42\% | -54\% | -70\% | -83\% |  |  |
| Investments |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hd of Inv Area - Fixed Income | \$225 | \$278 | \$350 | \$473 | \$619 | \$965 | 2 | 4 |
| Sr PM I- Fixed Income | 200 | 217 | 250 | 341 | 416 | 535 | 1 | 4 |
| Hd of Area/Asset Class - Real Estate | 225 | 260 | 290 | 566 | 651 | 800 | 3 | 4 |
| Sr PM I - Fixed Income | 200 | 217 | 250 | 341 | 416 | 535 | 2 | 4 |
| Hd of Area/Team Leader - Priv EQ | 260 | 327 | 386 | 480 | 652 | 781 | 4 | 4 |
| Hd of Area/Team Leader - EQ | 248 | 312 | 375 | 360 | 424 | 573 | 4 | 4 |
| Hd of Area/Team Leader - Priv EQ | 260 | 327 | 386 | 480 | 652 | 781 | 4 | 4 |
| Sr PM I-Real Estate | 193 | 200 | 211 | 331 | 415 | 477 | 4 | 4 |
| Sr Mgr / Sr PM I | 166 | 188 | 219 | 258 | 301 | 405 | 3 | 4 |
| Sr PM II - Fixed Income | 141 | 169 | 199 | 216 | 271 | 358 | 2 | 4 |
| Sr Risk/Inv Strat | 140 | 171 | 205 | 179 | 258 | 345 | 3 | 4 |
| Sr PM II-EQ | 170 | 205 | 250 | 227 | 379 | 600 | 4 | 4 |
| Sr PM II-EQ | 170 | 205 | 250 | 227 | 379 | 600 | 4 | 4 |
| Sr Port Analyst / Port Analyst | 72 | 86 | 110 | 88 | 115 | 150 | 1 | 2 |
| Sr Portfolio Analyst | 80 | 100 | 140 | 109 | 151 | 200 | 2 | 3 |
| Sr Portfolio Analyst | 80 | 100 | 140 | 109 | 151 | 200 | 2 | 3 |
| Sr Portfolio Analyst | 80 | 100 | 140 | 109 | 151 | 200 | 2 | 3 |
| Sr Port Analyst / Port Analyst | 72 | 86 | 110 | 88 | 115 | 150 | 1 | 2 |
| Interm Analyst - Ext Inv | 63 | 70 | 80 | 63 | 77 | 88 | 1 | 2 |
| Interm Analyst - Ext Inv | 63 | 70 | 80 | 63 | 77 | 88 | 1 | 2 |
|  | \$3,108 | \$3,688 | \$4,420 | \$5,108 | \$6,668 | \$8,831 | 3 | 4 |
|  | 17\% | -1\% | -17\% | -29\% | -45\% | -59\% |  |  |



## 2018 McLagan Pension Funds Compensation Survey - US

## All Participants

## WYOMING RETIREMENT SYS

October 09, 2018

## HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

All information distributed to clients by McLagan in connection with the Annual Compensation Survey Program should be treated with strictest confidentiality. All participating firms have signed a non-disclosure agreement which explicitly states that no survey information will be communicated to any other organization, industry news organization, or any individual not directly employed by the organization or a directly affiliated organization (i.e., parent or subsidiary).

## 2018 McLagan Pension Funds Compensation Survey - US (037) - Management Summary



| McLagan | 09-Oct-18 037-00-W |
| :--- | ---: |
| Proprietary \& Confidential |  |

## 2018 McLagan Pension Funds Compensation Survey - US (037)



## 2018 McLagan Pension Funds Compensation Survey - US (037)

| Wyoming Retirement Sys |  |  | Function: Manager-of-Managers/Manager Oversight |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Position Code: 037-35-0400 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Market: All Participants |  |  | Position: |  |  | Team Leader - Ext. Inv All Specializations Combined |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currency: USD (000's) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 2017 TOTAL CASH |  |  |  |  | 2017 TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |  | 2018 SALARY |  |  |  |  |
|  | MARKEt |  | MARKET |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  | MARKET |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  | MARKET |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  |
|  | FIRMS | $\begin{gathered} \text { \# } \\ \text { Incs } \end{gathered}$ | $\stackrel{\text { LOw }}{\substack{\text { LuARTILE } \\(25 \%)}}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { MIGH } \\ \text { QUARILE } \\ (75 \%) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | VARIANCE <br> TO MEDIAN <br> $-50 \%$ 0\% 50\% | $\underset{(25 \%)}{\substack{\text { QUARILE }}}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { HIGH } \\ \text { QUATLILE } \\(75 \%)}}{\text { Hen }}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | VARIANCE <br> TO MEDIAN <br> -50\% 0\% 50\% | $\underset{\substack{\text { QUATHILE } \\(25 \%)}}{\text { LOWW }}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { HIGH } \\ \text { QUATLIE } \\ (75 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | VARIANCE <br> TO MEDIAN <br> $-50 \% \quad 0 \% 50 \%$ |
| Team Leader - External Inv All Spec. Comb. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 037-35-0400 - Team Leader - External Inv All Spec. Comb. | 31 | 59 | 193.8 | 257.5 | 357.6 | 189.0 | I | 193.8 | 282.1 | 359.9 | 189.0 | I | 191.4 | 222.2 | 260.0 | 189.0 | - |
| 037-35-0501 - Team Leader - External Inv Equity | 10 | 10 | 174.2 | 192.2 | 311.7 | 189.0 |  | 174.2 | 192.2 | 311.7 | 189.0 |  |  | 195.2 | - | 189.0 |  |
| 037-35-0502 - Team Leader - External Inv Fixed-Income | 6 | 6 | - | 229.2 | - | 189.0 | $\cdots$ | - | 242.5 | - | 189.0 | $\square$ | - | 160.5 | - | 189.0 | $\square$ |
| 037-35-0503 - Team Leader - External Inv Real Estate | 8 | 8 | - | 296.5 | - | - |  | - | 296.5 | - | - |  |  | 236.8 | - | - |  |
| 037-35-0504 - Team Leader - External Inv Hedge Funds | 5 | 5 |  | 221.5 |  |  |  |  | 225.9 |  | - |  |  | 220.7 |  |  |  |
| 037-35-0505 - Team Leader - External Inv Priv. EQ/Venture | 20 | 22 | 220.5 | 272.6 | 404.2 | - |  | 220.5 | 289.2 | 447.6 | - |  | 200.0 | 224.6 | 248.7 | - |  |
| 037-35-0509 - Team Leader - External Inv Generalist | 7 | 8 | - | 291.4 | - | - |  | - | 291.4 | - | - |  | - | 234.4 | - | - |  |
| By the Fund's Bonus Practice |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Bonus Paying | 14 | 27 | 168.6 | 213.0 | 272.6 | 189.0 | $\square$ | 168.6 | 213.0 | 272.6 | 189.0 | $\square$ | 169.8 | 221.5 | 256.6 | 189.0 | $\square$ |
| Bonus Paying | 16 | 31 | 247.4 | 334.4 | 397.9 |  |  | 261.2 | 336.3 | 454.6 | - |  | 202.5 | 228.9 | 265.0 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Assets Under Management |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less than \$10 Billion | - | - | - | - | - | 189.0 |  | - | - | - | 189.0 |  | - | - | - | 189.0 |  |
| \$10-\$40 Billion | 8 | 10 | 176.6 | 215.6 | 227.9 | - |  | 190.1 | 215.6 | 227.9 | - |  | 183.3 | 221.5 | 239.6 | - |  |
| \$40 Billion and Above | 18 | 42 | 214.7 | 298.0 | 382.6 | - |  | 214.7 | 298.0 | 406.6 | - |  | 199.7 | 228.9 | 280.6 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Location |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| East | 5 | 16 | 160.8 | 256.0 | 365.4 | - |  | 160.8 | 256.0 | 371.9 | - |  | 165.0 | 205.0 | 240.0 | - |  |
| Mid West | 7 | 12 | 217.4 | 278.6 | 321.9 | - |  | 217.4 | 278.6 | 321.9 | - |  | 192.2 | 220.0 | 234.4 | - |  |
| South | 6 | 9 | 221.5 | 257.5 | 293.0 | - |  | 221.5 | 257.5 | 293.0 | - |  | 200.0 | 221.8 | 234.3 | - |  |
| West | 12 | 21 | 207.4 | 287.7 | 360.8 | 189.0 | $\square$ | 213.0 | 291.6 | 373.1 | 189.0 | $\square$ | 220.0 | 280.6 | 326.7 | 189.0 | $\square$ |
| By the Fund's Management Style |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primarily Internally Managed Assets | 3 | 11 | 181.8 | 224.6 | 398.4 | - |  | 191.9 | 224.6 | 434.7 | ${ }^{\circ}$ |  | 177.3 | 199.8 | 222.5 | $\bar{\circ}$ |  |
| Primarily Externally Managed Assets | 23 | 47 | 209.8 | 287.7 | 357.6 | 189.0 | III | 212.5 | 290.6 | 357.6 | 189.0 | ! | 193.8 | 231.6 | 271.5 | 189.0 | I |

## 2018 McLagan Pension Funds Compensation Survey - US (037)



## 2018 McLagan Pension Funds Compensation Survey - US (037)

| Wyoming Retirement Sys <br> All Participants | Function: Manager-of-Managers/Manager Oversight |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Position Code: 037-35-0900 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Position: |  |  | Intermediate Analyst - External Investments - Al |  |  |  | All Specializations Combined |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| USD (000's) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | MARKET |  | 2017 TOTAL CASH |  |  |  |  | 2017 TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |  | 2018 SALARY |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | market |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  | MARKET |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  | market |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { \# } \\ \text { FIRMS } \end{gathered}$ | incs | $\begin{gathered} \text { LOW } \\ \text { QuARILE } \\ (25 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { HIGH } \\ \text { QUARTLE } \\(75 \%)}}{ }$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { MEDIAN } \\ (50 \%) \end{gathered}$ | VARIANCE TO MEDIAN -50\% 0\% 50\% | $\underset{\substack{\text { QUATHILE } \\(25 \%)}}{\text { LOWF }}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { HIGH } \\ \text { QUARTLE } \\ (75 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | VARIANCE <br> TO MEDIAN <br> $-50 \% \quad 0 \% \quad 50 \%$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { LOW } \\ \text { QUATILE } \\(25 \%)}}{ }$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { HIGH } \\ \text { QUATILE } \\(75 \%)}}{ }$ | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\substack{\text { MEDIAN }}}$ | VARIANCE TO MEDIAN -50\% 0\% 50\% |
| Int Analyst - External Inv All Spec. Comb. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 037-35-0900 - Int Analyst - External Inv All Spec. Comb. | 21 | 80 | 81.5 | 91.6 | 108.7 |  |  | 81.8 | 91.6 | 109.4 |  |  | 82.4 | 91.4 | 106.8 |  |  |
| 037-35-0901 - Int Analyst - External Inv Equity | 6 | 9 | 83.9 | 95.2 | 104.0 |  |  | 83.9 | 95.2 | 104.0 |  |  | 81.1 | 88.1 | 95.2 |  |  |
| 037-35-0902 - Int Analyst - External Inv Fixed-Income | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |  | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 037-35-0903 - Int Analyst - External Inv Real Estate | 5 | 19 | 86.9 | 91.6 | 107.1 |  |  | 86.9 | 91.6 | 107.1 | - |  | - | - | - |  |  |
| 037-35-0904 - Int Analyst - External Inv Hedge Funds | 5 | 5 |  | 94.3 |  |  |  |  | 94.3 | - |  |  | - | 89.0 | - |  |  |
| 037-35-0905 - Int Analyst - External Inv Priv. EQ/Venture | 11 | 26 | 78.2 | 89.1 | 103.4 |  |  | 79.0 | 89.1 | 103.4 |  |  | 78.6 | 88.4 | 110.8 |  |  |
| 037-35-0909 - Int Analyst - External Inv Generalist | 12 | 17 | 81.4 | 84.9 | 103.0 |  |  | 81.4 | 84.9 | 114.5 | - |  | 81.7 | 86.6 | 91.4 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Bonus Practice |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Bonus Paying | 12 | 30 | 84.9 | 102.0 | 131.0 |  |  | 84.9 | 102.0 | 131.0 | - |  | 84.1 | 94.3 | 142.5 | - |  |
| Bonus Paying | 8 | 47 | 79.2 | 85.3 | 100.4 |  |  | 80.1 | 88.1 | 100.4 | - |  | 80.5 | 89.1 | 99.2 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Assets Under Management |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less than \$10 Billion | - | - | - | - | - |  |  | - | - | - | - |  | - | - |  |  |  |
| \$10-\$40 Billion | - | - | - | - | ${ }^{-}$ |  |  | - | - | - | - |  | - | ${ }^{-}$ | - |  |  |
| \$40 Billion and Above | 14 | 69 | 82.7 | 91.6 | 108.5 |  |  | 82.7 | 91.6 | 109.2 | - |  | 83.8 | 92.5 | 106.8 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Location |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| East | 6 | 11 | 89.3 | 104.0 | 132.0 |  |  | 89.3 | 104.0 | 132.0 | - |  | 80.6 | 89.3 | 121.8 | - |  |
| Mid West | 6 | 9 | 75.9 | 78.7 | 96.2 |  |  | 75.9 | 78.7 | 96.2 | - |  | - | 84.9 | - |  |  |
| South | - | - |  | - |  |  |  |  | - |  | - |  | , | - | - |  |  |
| West | 5 | 46 | 83.8 | 91.2 | 112.1 | - |  | 83.8 | 91.2 | 112.1 | - |  | 85.0 | 95.2 | 108.1 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Management Style |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primarily Internally Managed Assets | 4 | 47 | 812 |  | 116.9 |  |  | 81.6 | 95. | 116.9 | - |  | 84.3 80.8 | 95.2 88.0 | 106.8 | - |  |
| Primarily Externally Managed Assets | 16 | 47 | 81.2 | 95.2 | 116.9 |  |  | 81.6 | 95.2 | 116.9 |  |  | 80.8 | 88.0 | 122.2 |  |  |


| McLagan | 09-Oct-18 037-00-W2 |
| :--- | :---: |
| Proprietary \& Confidential |  |

## 2018 McLagan Pension Funds Compensation Survey - US (037)

| Firm: Wyoming Retirement Sys | Function: Legal |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Position Code: 037-79-0200 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Market: All Participants | Position: Chief Legal Officer |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currency: USD (000's) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 2017 TOTAL CASH |  |  |  |  | 2017 TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |  | 2018 SALARY |  |  |  |  |
|  | Market |  | MARKEt |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  | MARKEt |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  | market |  |  | WYOMING RETIREMENT S |  |
|  | \# FIRMS | $\begin{gathered} \text { \# } \\ \text { INCs } \end{gathered}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { LOW } \\ \text { QUATLIL } \\(25 \%)}}{ }$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { MEDIAN } \\ (50 \%) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { HIGH } \\ \text { QUARTLE } \\ (75 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { MEDIAN } \\ (50 \%) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | VARIANCE <br> TO MEDIAN <br> -50\% 0\% 50\% | $\underset{\substack{\text { LOW } \\ \text { QUARILE } \\(25 \%)}}{ }$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { MEDIAN } \\ (50 \%) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  | $\underset{(50 \%)}{\text { MEDIAN }}$ | VARIANCE <br> TO MEDIAN <br> -50\% 0\% 50\% | $\begin{gathered} \text { LOW } \\ \text { QURTILE } \\ (25 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { MEDIAN } \\ (50 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\underset{(75 \%)}{\substack{\text { QUARHILE }}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { MEDIAN } \\ & (50 \%) \end{aligned}$ | VARIANCE <br> TO MEDIAN <br> -50\% 0\% 50\% |
| Chief Legal Officer |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 037-79-0200-Chief Legal Officer | 31 | 32 | 132.9 | 192.9 | 274.9 | 122.2 | II | 132.9 | 192.9 | 274.9 | 122.2 | 1 | 136.2 | 187.2 | 237.5 | 122.2 | I |
| By the Fund's Bonus Practice |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Bonus Paying | 12 | 12 | 132.9 | 178.1 | 216.8 | 122.2 | III | 132.9 | 178.1 | 216.8 | 122.2 | II | 132.9 | 168.2 | 208.6 | 122.2 | T |
| Bonus Paying | 17 | 18 | 144.0 | 205.7 | 280.2 | - |  | 144.0 | 205.7 | 327.9 |  |  | 142.3 | 230.0 | 276.8 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Assets Under Management |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less than \$10 Billion | 5 | 6 | - | 142.9 | 1807 | 122.2 | $\square$ | ${ }^{-}$ | 142.9 |  | 122.2 | $\square$ | - | 138.3 | - | 122.2 | $\square$ |
| \$10-\$40 Billion | 9 | 9 | 134.6 | 147.3 | 180.7 | - |  | 134.6 | 147.3 | 180.7 | - |  | 134.6 | 154.7 | 184.3 | - |  |
| \$40 Billion and Above | 15 | 15 | 196.9 | 274.1 | 371.9 | - |  | 196.9 | 274.1 | 392.4 | - |  | 193.5 | 240.3 | 277.1 | - |  |
| By the Fund's Location |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| East | 5 | 5 | - | 186.9 | - | - |  | - | 186.9 | - | - |  | - | 180.7 | - | - |  |
| Mid West | 10 | 11 | 115.8 | 138.1 | 189.0 | - |  | 115.8 | 138.1 | 189.0 | - |  | 113.6 | 141.5 | 197.2 | - |  |
| South | 5 | 5 |  | 281.2 |  | - |  |  | 294.3 |  |  |  |  | 226.8 | - |  |  |
| West | 9 | 9 | 190.1 | 209.0 | 277.2 | 122.2 | $\square 1$ | 190.1 | 209.0 | 277.2 | 122.2 | $\square$ | - | 216.8 | - | 122.2 | $\square$ |
| By the Fund's Management Style |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primarily Internally Managed Assets | 7 | 7 | - | 274.1 | - | - |  | - | 274.1 | - | - |  | - | 256.0 | - |  |  |
| Primarily Externally Managed Assets | 22 | 23 | 131.3 | 180.7 | 219.0 | 122.2 | I | 131.3 | 180.7 | 219.0 | 122.2 | II | 136.2 | 181.2 | 219.4 | 122.2 | II |


| McLagan <br> Proprietary \& Confidential | 09-Oct-18 037 - $00-$ W2B | NOTE: Your firm has signed a non-disclosure agreement. Results are STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and for INTERNAL USE ONLY. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

## Appendix C - Statistical Summary of NASRA Peer Data

## Size vs. Return

There is a slight correlation, in the sample that WRS collected, of larger funds performing better than smaller funds. While the correlations are not statistically significant, over the 3-, and 5 -year periods, larger funds exhibited slightly higher returns than smaller funds on average ( $36 \%$ and $17 \%$, respectively). Over the $1-$, and 10 -year periods there was close to zero correlation and the 10 -year was slightly negative ( $1.8 \%$ and $-3.2 \%$, respectively). The sample size for the $1-, 3$-, 5 -, and 10 -year periods is $48,48,48$, and 37 .

## Internal vs. Return

Of the sample that WRS collected, $54 \%$ (13/24), $63 \%$ (15/24), $58 \% ~(14 / 24)$, and $45 \%(9 / 20)$ of those funds who manage internally had a return greater than median for the 1-, $3-, 5-$, and 10 year periods, respectively. The percent of funds that manage their funds strictly externally with returns greater than average for the 1-, $3-$, 5 -, and 10 -year periods were $46 \%$ ( $11 / 24$ ), $38 \%$ ( $9 / 24$ ), $42 \%(10 / 24)$, and $53 \%(9 / 17)$, respectively. The average returns for funds that manage internally were $12.9 \%, 5.8 \%, 9.2 \%$, and $5.2 \%$ for the $1-, 3-, 5-$, and 10 -year periods, respectively. The average returns for funds that manage externally were $12.6 \%, 5.3 \%, 8.9 \%$, and $5.5 \%$ for the $1-$, $3-$ - 5-, and 10-year periods, respectively. This doesn't take into effect size of funds or the degree of active with internal funds. Overall, the results are mixed and largely inconclusive.

## CIO tenure vs. Return

While it is hard to draw conclusions from the sample that WRS collected, funds with longer CIO tenures had a slight positive correlation with the better quartiles. For the 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods, the correlation between CIO tenure and quartile were $9.6 \%, 38.5 \%, 21.3 \%$, and $17.7 \%$, respectively. The median CIO tenure for the sample of 43 was 7.5 years, and the average was 8.6 years. There are 43 observations for 1-, 3-, and 5-year periods. There are 33 observations for the 10-year correlation.

## Appendix D - Excerpt from Previous Responses to Subcommittee

## Overview

WRS values the JAC's support over the years in building out our investment program, which has been an important contributor to safeguarding and maximizing the value of plan assets. Stability of our investment team is key to a successful investment program, and the WRS Board appreciates the interest of the JAC in exploring a performance compensation program to assist us in attracting and retaining the best and brightest to WRS. Our partnership with the University of Wyoming through our internship program has allowed us to hire the next generation of smart young professionals to provide us with bench strength for the future. We thank you for your continued interest in the WRS investment program, and look forward to our upcoming meeting.

## Purpose of the Report

This report was created to respond to the JAC Subcommittee \#2's follow-up questions from the meeting in Casper on 8/17/2018.

## a. Provide performance statistics for the "smaller" statewide pension funds with some internal management identified by the Subcommittee, and draw any conclusions.

Using the data we have collected on all public plans included in the NASRA data set provided by LSO, the eight plans with internal management that were selected by the Subcommittee slightly underperformed the peer set for the $3-, 5-$, and 10 -year periods.

The amount of internal management is only one of many variables that can impact fund performance, and its impact could be positive or negative. Several other variables contribute to divergence in returns over time, the most impactful of which is asset allocation. Other variables include: active vs. passive management; CIO/staff tenure; maturity of private investments program; resources available to staff; location (staffing, access to managers, ease of travel); complexity; and size of plan. Because of the myriad of variables at play, it is not possible to draw any conclusion based on any one variable in isolation.

The following table shows return quartiles (quartile "1" represents the best performance quartile) of the eight public plans the subcommittee identified with assets under $\$ 20$ billion that manage a portion of their assets in-house. Returns are as of the most recent period for which comparable information is available (June 30, 2017). Performance quartile breakpoints are based on the NASRA list of public plans provided by LSO. In the table below, "Internal Management Type" categorizes the types of internal management by complexity and alpha (outperformance) potential. While there is not a large enough sample size to draw conclusions, WRS' analysis
indicates there is no statistically significant relationship between internal management and 10-year returns. Internal management definitions:

- "Passive" - Replicating a benchmark such as the S\&P without any modification.
- "Semi-Passive" - Replicating a benchmark but making adjustments to modify exposure to factors such as "value" and "growth", in an attempt to outperform the benchmark. This is generally done by licensing a proprietary "factor" benchmark from a provider and following their suggested rebalance trades. This strategy does not involve fundamental analysis of individual securities.
- "Active" - Selecting individual securities such as stocks and bonds, based on time-intensive fundamental analysis. This approach can lead to returns that vary greatly from a given benchmark. Active management risk is typically greater than that of passive investing.

| As of 6/30/17 |  |  | Quartile Rank |  |  |  | Returns (Sorted by 10-Year) |  |  |  |  | Internal Management Type |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fund | Assets $(\$ \mathbf{B})$ | CIO Tenure (Years; as of ~2017) | 1-Year | 3-Year | 5-Year | 10-Year | 1-Year | 3- Year | 5-Year | 10-Year | \% Internal | Passive | Semi- <br> Passive | Active |
| MO LAGERS | \$7.0 | 12 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 12.0\% | 4.5\% | 9.3\% | 6.2\% | 18\% | x | x |  |
| SD RS | \$11.6 | 12 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 13.8\% | 6.0\% | 11.1\% | 6.1\% | 75\% |  |  | x |
| LA SERS | \$11.0 | 20 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 15.8\% | 4.7\% | 9.0\% | 5.6\% | 32\% | x |  |  |
| NM ERB | \$12.23 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 12.0\% | 6.1\% | 8.7\% | 5.2\% | 33\% |  |  | x |
| MI MERS | \$10.0 | 15 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 13.2\% | 7.5\% | 8.7\% | 5.0\% | 34\% | x | x | x |
| AK PERS | \$17.8 | 15 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 13.4\% | 5.3\% | 9.2\% | 5.0\% | 15\% | x | x |  |
| KY RS | \$3.5 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 13.5\% | 4.8\% | 8.1\% | 4.9\% | 18\% | x | x |  |
| AZ PSPRS | \$7.6 | 13 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 11.9\% | 5.3\% | 8.0\% | 4.0\% | 9\% |  |  | x |
| Average | \$10.1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 13.2\% | 5.5\% | 9.0\% | 5.2\% |  |  |  |  |
| NASRA Peer Average | \$43.5 | 9 |  |  |  |  | 12.8\% | 5.6\% | 9.1\% | 5.3\% |  |  |  |  |
| Difference from NASRA |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.4\% | -0.1\% | -0.1\% | -0.1\% |  |  |  |  |
| Note: 1st quartile is the highest returning quartile. Quartile cutoffs and peer average refer to NASRA peer set as of 6/30/17. AK PERS is $\$ 17.8$ bn, but the other pooled investments account for an additional $\$ 14$ bn in assets. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

It is impossible to determine the impact of any one variable, such as percentage of assets managed internally, on overall fund performance, because there are so many other relevant variables and multicollinearity. The vast majority of performance variability between plans is determined by asset allocation. A smaller portion is due to a variety of other factors such as the decision to allocate more or less to active versus passive mandates, which is referred to as "active risk" i.e. owning a unique set of individual stocks compared to the benchmark such as the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$. Once that decision is made, the implementation decision of whether to invest that mandate internally to save fees or execute through external managers can result in differing outcomes.

Active risk results in higher risk, relative to the benchmark, but is the only way to outperform the benchmark. Of the plans identified by the Subcommittee, only two of them have mandates that provide the potential to outperform their benchmarks substantially via active risk; South Dakota Retirement System (SD RS) and Michigan Municipal Employees' Retirement System (MI MERS). The remaining plans identified by the Subcommittee have varying degrees of active risk, but to a much lesser degree than SD RS and MI MERS, and therefore their returns are largely attributable to asset allocation. Please see Appendix A for a conceptual diagram of the degree of internal fee savings versus the difficulty to implement; and Appendix B for a summary of variables tested using the NASRA universe to determine a possible correlation with returns.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The $75 \%$ Public Median/ 25\% Private Median is a simple weighted average of the Public Median Combined amount provided by McLagan to WRS and the Private data from the McLagan presentation to Alaska Permanent Fund.

